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This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters that are contributions to
research in experimental, behavioral and applied empirical economics. Each chapter
has its own introduction and appendix and can be read independently of the other two
chapters. Still, to some extent, the three chapters can be subsumed under the common
theme of "give and take".
The ￿rst chapter questions the utilitarians￿claim that acting according to maximin
preferences behind the veil of ignorance is only optimal for in￿nitively risk averse
individuals. It shows experimentally that maximin preferences are compatible with
any degree of risk aversion if social preferences for equality are su¢ ciently strong. In
the experiment subjects play variants of the dictator game without and behind the veil
of ignorance. A standard dictator game consists of the decision how much (to take
from the own initial endowment and) to give to another subject. Thus the ￿rst chapter
investigates giving behavior.
Taking or stealing is the central theme of the second chapter. Experimental subjects
have the possibility to steal from another subject￿ s initial endowment. By varying the
intensity of deterrent incentives (i.e. detection probability and ￿ne for stealing) the
experiment tests Becker￿ s (1968) deterrence hypothesis that crime rates are decreasing
in deterrent incentives.
Finally, the third chapter uses ￿eld data to investigate whether and how parental
employment a⁄ects children￿ s educational attainment. Parents￿decision to participate
in the labor market largely determines how much time and good inputs they can give
to their children. Economic models of knowledge acquisition in childhood usually
assume that children take the time and good inputs and convert them into educationalPreface 2
achievement.
The ￿rst two chapters of this dissertation use experimental methods. In 2002,
Vernon Smith, one of the earliest experimenters in economics, has been awarded the
Nobel price in economics. This manifests that experimental methods have become an
established tool in empirical economic analysis. One very fundamental consequence of
experimental evidence has been to question the pure self-interest assumption underlying
standard neo-classical economic analysis. By now, it is widely accepted that preferences
are heterogeneous: while some individuals￿preferences are consistent with pure self-
interest others have other-regarding preferences. Many di⁄erent concepts of other-
regarding preferences have been developed: in addition to own material well-being
preferences are assumed to potentially depend on other individuals￿absolute or relative
material well-being, other individuals￿fair or unfair behavior or other individuals￿type
such as generally being sel￿sh, spiteful or altruistic.1 This dissertation uses concepts of
and ￿nds evidence for models of social preferences. The utility function of an individual
with social preferences does not only depend on his own material well-being but may
also be a function of the allocation of resources within his reference group. In particular,
we use models of inequity aversion as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) in which people are assumed to su⁄er from unequal allocations.
Outcomes in competitive experimental markets often converge to equilibrium pre-
dictions of standard neo-classical theory and thus may be una⁄ected by the existence
of social preferences. In contrast, social preferences shape the outcomes in distribu-
tional games such as dictator and ultimatum games.2 The ￿rst two chapters of this
dissertation investigate distributional games in non-competitive experimental environ-
ments. Hence, we expect to ￿nd and indeed do ￿nd that players with social preferences
crucially in￿ uence our results.
1For a recent survey on theories of other-regarding preferences see Fehr and Schmidt (2006, Section
3).
2Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) show that both empirical ￿ndings
in competitive markets and distributional games are consistent with their model of heterogeneous -
inequity-averse and sel￿sh - types of players. The intuition is that there exist important interactions
between the distribution of preferences and the strategic environment: only if single players can a⁄ect
relative material payo⁄s, equality considerations will a⁄ect experimental outcomes. This is usually
not the case in competitive environments but in distributional decisions.Preface 3
The classic game used in experimental economics to elicit a player￿ s distributional
preferences is the dictator game. A dictator game is a very simple two-player game
in which the ￿rst player, the dictator, proposes a split of a given pie. The second
player, the receiver, is completely passive. Both players are paid according to the
dictator￿ s proposal. Since there is no strategic interaction between the two players, the
dictator￿ s proposal re￿ ects his pure distributional preferences. The dictator game has
been introduced by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Forsythe et al. (1994).
Camerer (2003, Ch. 2) surveys the literature on dictator games. The experiments
presented in chapters 1 and 2 are inspired by the dictator game, but heavily modify it.
The game played in chapter 1 is a dictator game with two additional features: ￿rst,
our dictator game is characterized by an e¢ ciency loss of 50 % for each unit that the
decision maker assigns the receiver. The e¢ ciency loss introduces a trade-o⁄ between
equality and e¢ ciency. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), Andreoni and Miller (2002)
and Fisman, Kariv and Markovits (2007) also use dictator games with an e¢ ciency
loss. Second, we add role uncertainty to implement the veil of ignorance, i.e. at the
time the transfer decision is made the decision maker does not yet know whether he
will be paid as dictator or receiver.
The second chapter analyzes behavior in a take game, the mirror image of the
standard dictator game. In a take game the dictator decides how much to take from
the positive initial endowment of the second passive player (instead of how much to
give to the second player as in a standard dictator game). Bardsley (2005), List (2005)
and Krupka and Weber (2006) use games in which dictators can choose between giving
to or taking from the second passive player. Since our aim is to simulate stealing in
the laboratory, we, in contrast, use a pure take game frame. Furthermore, we augment
the take game with varying levels of incentives that make taking less attractive since
we aim at testing the deterrence hypothesis.
The experiment presented in the ￿rst chapter questions the view that behind the
veil of ignorance maximin preferences necessarily represent preferences with in￿nite risk
aversion. The philosopher John Rawls (1971) argued that behind the veil of ignorance
people would vote for the di⁄erence principle, i.e. in favor of maximizing the utility ofPreface 4
the worst o⁄individual. Utilitarians generally do not accept this claim and stress that
voting for the di⁄erence principle would only be strictly optimal for in￿nitely risk averse
individuals. In contrast, we hypothesize that maximin preferences are compatible with
any degree of risk aversion if social preferences for equality are su¢ ciently strong. We
test this hypothesis experimentally.
The experimental design is based on a dictator game with two additional charac-
teristics. First, we implement the veil of ignorance by introducing role uncertainty:
each subject decides how many units of a given pie the dictator will give away to the
receiver before the subject is randomly assigned the role of dictator or receiver with
equal probability. Each subject will be paid in his assigned role according to his own
decision how many units the dictator will transfer to the receiver. Implementing the
veil of ignorance removes the possibility to favor oneself over the other subject and
introduces risk. Second, there is an e¢ ciency loss of 50 % for units that are transferred
from the dictator to the receiver. The e¢ ciency loss makes insurance costly and hence
allows measuring a subject￿ s degree of risk aversion. Additionally, it introduces a trade
o⁄ between equality and e¢ ciency in a two person game.
The core of the analysis is the comparison of the following two treatments: the veil
of ignorance treatment that is a dictator game with e¢ ciency loss and role uncertainty
as described above and the risk treatment. The risk treatment is identical to the veil
of ignorance treatment except for one di⁄erence. It is a one-person game: each subject
decides how to allocate the pie across the states of being dictator or being receiver and
is randomly assigned the position of either dictator or receiver afterwards. However,
the position not assigned to the decision maker is not ￿lled in by a second subject.
The two treatments are completely identical in terms of risk, but social preferences
can only matter if the decision a⁄ects at least one other subject besides the decision
maker, i.e. in the veil of ignorance treatment, but not in the risk treatment. Any
di⁄erence between the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment must be induced by
social preferences. In contrast to other economic experiments that implement the veil
of ignorance in the laboratory our experimental design allows separating the e⁄ects of
risk aversion and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance.Preface 5
We ￿nd that behind the veil of ignorance only a minority of subjects opts for
the di⁄erence principle. Decisions in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment
do not di⁄er signi￿cantly for men. In contrast, behind the veil of ignorance social
preferences are a second signi￿cant motivation besides risk for women and induce a
stronger concern for equality. Thus, our results for women imply that voting for the
di⁄erence principle is not only optimal for in￿nitely risk averse individuals, but also
for individuals with strong social preferences for equality. Furthermore, our results
contribute to the growing literature on gender di⁄erences in social preferences and risk
attitudes.
The experimental game in the second chapter focuses no longer on a pure dis-
tributional decision (under risk), but on how exogenously set incentives in￿ uence a
dictator￿ s distributional decision. Furthermore, we switch from a give to a take frame
of the dictator game.
How to e⁄ectively combat crime is the topic of an ongoing and vivid debate in the
general public, among politicians, judges, social workers and criminologists. Becker￿ s
(1968) deterrence hypothesis is the key contribution of economists to this debate. It
relies on the power of pure incentives and states that crime rates are weakly decreasing
in deterrent incentives, i.e. a crime￿ s detection probability and the level of punishment.
Empirical evidence from ￿eld data is often - but far from always - consistent with the
deterrence hypothesis and shows that variations in deterrent incentives can only explain
a small part of the variation in crime (see Glaeser, 1999 and Eide, 2000). A serious
drawback of ￿eld data tests of the deterrence hypothesis is the lack of appropriate data.
For example, individual level data are rarely available and results based on aggregate
data may su⁄er from simultaneity bias. We are the ￿rst to explicitly test the deterrence
hypothesis in the laboratory which permits to exogenously vary deterrent incentives
and to obtain representative individual level data. We ask a very basic but important
question: do deterrent incentives work?
In our take game design, two subjects, A and B, are matched randomly. Subject
A is passive and has a higher initial endowment than subject B. Subject B can decide
how much to take away (steal) from A￿ s initial endowment. With probability 1 ￿ p,Preface 6
this amount is transferred from A to B. With probability p ("detection probability"),
however, this amount is not transferred and a ￿xed ￿ne is deducted from B￿ s initial
endowment if B attempted to take a strictly positive amount. We conduct six di⁄erent
treatments in which we vary detection probability and ￿ne. The combined e⁄ect of
detection probability and ￿ne ranges from zero to strong deterrent incentives, i.e. levels
of incentives such that taking subject A￿ s whole initial endowment does not pay o⁄ in
expectation. Since weak deterrent incentives are especially relevant in real life, four
out of six treatments use small or intermediate incentives, i.e. incentives such that
taking everything pays o⁄ in expectation. Each subject participates in two di⁄erent
treatments sequentially such that we can analyze taking behavior both across subjects
and for a given subject.
For most experimental sessions, we use neutrally framed instructions because our
primary aim is to test the economic approach to crime that relies on incentive e⁄ects
only. As a robustness check we run a few "morally framed" sessions in which we talk
about "stealing" instead of "transfer decisions" and about a "￿ne" instead of "minus
points".
Our neutrally framed across subjects results clearly reject the deterrence hypoth-
esis. We ￿nd that incentives back￿re: on average subjects take signi￿cantly more in
treatments with intermediate deterrent incentives than in the absence of incentives.
Only very strong incentives deter. Both our neutrally framed across and within sub-
jects results can be explained by a model of two types: about 50 % of our subjects
are sel￿sh and react to deterrent incentives as predicted by the deterrence hypothesis.
The other 50 % are fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives back￿re by
crowding out fairness concerns. In our morally framed sessions we observe back￿ring
of incentives, too. Furthermore, we ￿nd that detection probability and ￿ne seem to be
interchangeable instruments.
Finally, the last chapter uses ￿eld data to investigate whether and how parental
employment a⁄ects children￿ s educational attainment. This is an important question
since it concerns the organization of every day life of virtually all families and has far-
reaching policy implications for the public provision of child care facilities, maternityPreface 7
leave legislation or the design of welfare and tax systems. Though there are numer-
ous studies on the e⁄ect of parental employment on children￿ s outcomes, the existing
evidence is very inconclusive. It stems nearly exclusively from U.S. and British data,
focuses largely on maternal employment and children￿ s outcomes at young ages. Chap-
ter 3 adds to the existing literature along all these dimensions: it uses a large German
panel data set, the German Socioeconomic Panel, for the ￿rst time to address the e⁄ect
of both maternal and paternal employment on children￿ s educational attainment. The
dependent variable of our analysis is attendance of high secondary school track that
has been shown to be an important predictor of later labor market success (Dustmann,
2004). Most importantly, in contrast to the vast majority of existing studies we ex-
plicitly address potential endogeneity problems: ￿rst, to deal with selection of parents
in the labor market we estimate a model on sibling di⁄erences that controls for all
unobserved time-invariant parent and household characteristics. Second, we tackle a
potential reversed causality problem, i.e. the fact that parents￿decision to work may be
a⁄ected by their child￿ s ability which in turn partially determines educational success).
To do so we only use parental employment when children are aged 0-3 such that their
ability is not yet fully revealed, exclude disabled children from the analysis and use
parental years of education as a proxy for children￿ s ability.
We analyze two potential e⁄ects of parental employment: a positive e⁄ect through
higher household income and a negative time e⁄ect since working parents spent less
time with their children. We use various direct and indirect measurements of parent￿ s
time inputs in raising their children when children are aged 0-3: daily time spent on
child care, weekly hours worked and the number of years in which parents worked full
time, part time or not at all.
In sum, we neither ￿nd evidence for a positive income e⁄ect nor a negative time
e⁄ect. Controlling for household income we can statistically rule out that having a
mother who works one hour more per week lowers the probability of high secondary
track attendance by more than 0.1 percentage points, an economically negligible num-
ber. Actually, all coe¢ cients of maternal employment are positive, but not signi￿cant
at conventional levels (though at a 9 to 11 % signi￿cance level). Coe¢ cients of father￿ s
employment are precisely estimated but too small to be signi￿cant. When we usePreface 8
parental time spent on child care instead of parental employment information as key
explanatory variable, coe¢ cients are also too small to be signi￿cant. Taken together,
our results imply that it is not parental employment or quantity of parent-child inter-
actions that is decisive for children￿ s educational attainments, but, for example, birth
order within a family, age relative to classmates or parental characteristics like their
level of education.Chapter 1
Is the veil of ignorance only a
concept about risk? An experiment
1.1 Introduction
Our experiment explores the relationship between social preferences and Rawls￿di⁄er-
ence principle that economists have formalized by maximin preferences. In his book
"A Theory of Justice" (1971) the philosopher John Rawls coined the term "veil of
ignorance" for the following thought experiment: Behind the veil of ignorance, nobody
knows which future position in society he (as well as other individuals) will be as-
signed when deciding how to distribute resources across di⁄erent positions. According
to Rawls society would agree behind the veil of ignorance that the di⁄erence principle
should constitute the basis of the social contract. The di⁄erence principle states that
society should maximize the utility of the individual that is worst o⁄. Utilitarians
have asserted that being in favor of the di⁄erence principle is only strictly optimal for
in￿nitely risk averse individuals and thus, have dismissed the di⁄erence principle and
maximin preferences as unrealistic. However, the Utilitarian￿ s argument assumes that
everybody is only interested in his own material payo⁄. In contrast, theories on social
preferences assume that people are self-interested to some degree, but also care about
(the payo⁄s of) others.3 In this paper, we argue that if people have social preferences,
3Focusing on the distribution of payo⁄s the notion of social preferences we use is most closely
related to Fehr and Schmidt￿ s (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels￿(2000) models of inequity aversion.Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 10
they could be in favor of an egalitarian distribution even if they are risk neutral.
Our experiment implements the veil of ignorance in the laboratory4 and tests
whether decisions behind the veil of ignorance are only driven by risk attitudes or also
by social preferences. Assume decisions behind the veil of ignorance re￿ ect (impartial)
social preferences for equality in addition to risk aversion. Then the di⁄erence principle
is consistent with any degree of risk aversion as long as social preferences for equality
are su¢ ciently strong to make individuals opt for a completely equal distribution.
Implementing the veil of ignorance we measure social preferences that are free
of self-interest in a narrow sense ("impartial social preferences"). In other words,
impartial social preferences are an individual￿ s preferences over distributions of payo⁄s
to himself and his reference group when favoring oneself over the others is not possible.
Information on people￿ s impartial social preferences can be useful for many aspects of
policy design, e.g. the design of tax, social security or public health insurance systems.
Imagine, as an example for eliciting social preferences, a survey in which you ask a
poor person whether he is in favor of more redistribution. If you get the answer ￿yes￿
you cannot interpret it unambiguously: does this person prefer more redistribution
because he is likely to pro￿t from it? Or does this person have an innate preference
for a more equal society? In contrast, if you had asked this person behind the veil of
ignorance and had received the (now impartial) answer ￿yes￿you would have known
that the latter is true (or that this person is risk averse).
Our experiment uses a three treatment design: the dictator game treatment is a
dictator game with a 50 % e¢ ciency loss. A dictator game is a two player game in
which the ￿rst player, the dictator, proposes a split of a given pie. The second player,
the receiver, is passive. Both players are paid according to the dictator￿ s proposal.5
Our speci￿c variant of the dictator game is characterized by an e¢ ciency loss of 50
% for units that are transferred from the dictator to the receiver. Consequently, a
For a recent survey on the literature on social preferences see Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
4With any implementation of the veil of ignorance in the laboratory subjects will know much more
than in Rawls￿original position, e.g. they will know their sex and ability. Still, the implementation of
the veil of ignorance is perfect with respect to subjects￿positions and implied payo⁄s. Hence, in our
experimental setup we can measure subjects￿risk attitudes and potential social preferences behind
the veil of ignorance and this is what we aim at.
5In this variant, the dictator game was ￿rst introduced by Forsythe et al. (1994).Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 11
trade o⁄ between equality and e¢ ciency6 arises: a more equal allocation can only be
achieved by transferring more which in turn induces a larger e¢ ciency loss. Our second
treatment, the veil of ignorance treatment, is characterized by the same e¢ ciency loss,
but adds role uncertainty to implement the veil of ignorance: each participant decides
how many units of a 12 unit pie the dictator will give away to the receiver before he is
assigned the role of dictator or receiver with equal probability. Finally, each participant
will be paid according to his own choice how many units the dictator will transfer to
the receiver in the role he has been assigned, i.e. will earn either the dictator￿ s or the
receiver￿ s payo⁄. Using role uncertainty to implement the veil of ignorance removes the
possibility to favor oneself over the other player and, at the same time, introduces risk.
The risk treatment serves as a control treatment to isolate a subject￿ s risk preferences.
It has the same e¢ ciency loss and role uncertainty as the veil of ignorance treatment,
but it is a one person game. In the risk treatment each participant decides how to
allocate the pie across the states of being dictator or being receiver and is randomly
assigned the position of either dictator or receiver afterwards. However, the position
not assigned to the decision maker is not ￿lled in by a second person. The money
assigned to the empty position is not paid out. The e¢ ciency loss enables us to tell
apart subjects with di⁄erent degrees of risk aversion. In terms of risk, the decision
situation in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment is identical, but impartial
social preferences can only be an additional motive in the two person veil of ignorance
treatment.
By comparing decisions in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment we can test
our hypothesis that the di⁄erence principle can be derived from any degree of risk
aversion as long as impartial social preferences for equality are su¢ ciently strong. If
decisions in these two treatments don￿ t di⁄er signi￿cantly only risk aversion determines
behavior behind the veil of ignorance. Hence, the claim that the di⁄erence principle
can only be derived from in￿nite risk aversion is correct. If, in contrast, di⁄erences
between the two treatments are signi￿cant and impartial social preferences in the veil
of ignorance treatment re￿ ect equality concerns, then the di⁄erence principle is com-
6In this paper, we de￿ne a more e¢ cient allocation to be an allocation with a higher sum of payo⁄s
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patible with any degree of risk aversion if impartial social preferences for equality are
su¢ ciently strong.
We ￿nd that subjects transfer signi￿cantly more in the veil of ignorance than in
the dictator game treatment. Still, in the veil of ignorance treatment only a minority
of subjects opts for the di⁄erence principle. In all three treatments we observe striking
gender di⁄erences: women are more risk averse and have a stronger concern for equality
than men. For men behavior does not di⁄er signi￿cantly in the risk and the veil of
ignorance treatment, i.e. for the vast majority of male subjects the veil of ignorance
introduces only risk. In contrast, for women, impartial social preferences for equality
are a second signi￿cant motivation besides risk in the veil of ignorance treatment. Our
results for women imply that the di⁄erence principle can also be derived from impartial
social preferences for equality and thus does not necessarily imply in￿nite risk aversion.
Some other economic experiments implement the veil of ignorance. Johannesson
and Gerdtham (1995), Beckman et al. (2002), Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson and Daru-
vala (2002), and Carlsson, Gupta and Johansson-Stenman (2003) basically let subjects
who do not yet know the place they (or their imaginary grandchildren) will occupy in a
given society choose between societies that di⁄er with respect to mean and distribution
of income. Ackert, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2004) ask subjects to vote in favor of
either a lump-sum or a progressive tax regime before they are randomly assigned a pre-
tax payo⁄. To be able to interpret the observed behavior in terms of impartial social
preferences, all mentioned experiments have to assume that subjects are risk neutral.
Otherwise, the observed behavior can only be interpreted as the result of either risk
aversion or impartial social preferences. The new contribution of our experiment is
that we are able to separate the e⁄ects of risk aversion and impartial social preferences
in a veil of ignorance setting.7
Only few further experiments in economics have elicited impartial social preferences
without referring to the veil of ignorance. In Engelmann and Strobel (2004) one of the
decision maker￿ s tasks is to choose among three di⁄erent allocations of payo⁄s across
7The veil of ignorance has also been the subject of experimental inquiries in other disciplines such
that political sciences and psychology (Brickman, 1977; Curtis, 1979; Frohlich, Oppenheimer and
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himself and two further subjects that represent an e¢ ciency-equality trade o⁄. Since
the decision maker￿ s payo⁄ is constant across all three allocations, the experimental
design controls for self-interest. A constant payo⁄ for the decision maker also implies
that his choice has no monetary consequences for himself. In contrast, one crucial as-
pect of the veil of ignorance, our object of investigation, is that both the decision maker
and his reference group are a⁄ected by choices made behind the veil of ignorance.8
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The details of the experimental
design and implementation are explained in section 2. Section 3 presents the hypotheses
to be tested and links them to the experimental design. Results are provided in section
4 that also elaborates on the striking di⁄erences in the behavior of male and female
subjects. In the last section, we conclude. The appendix contains instructions, control
questions and the experimental data.
1.2 Experimental Design and Procedure
1.2.1 The three treatments
The experimental design is based on a dictator game. Since the receiver is purely
passive, the dictator game is one of the simplest ways to elicit the dictator￿ s social
preferences that do not interfere with any strategic considerations. In our experiment,
dictators have to decide how to split a 12 unit pie.
We use a three treatment design. The dictator game treatment is a standard dictator
game with one additional feature, an e¢ ciency loss of 50 % for units transferred from
the dictator to the receiver. The e¢ ciency loss introduces a trade-o⁄ between equality
and e¢ ciency and can be interpreted as a deadweight loss that arises as the cost of
redistribution. We choose an e¢ ciency loss of 50 % because it is easy to calculate
for the experimental subjects and makes our results comparable to those obtained in
8Being a⁄ected by one￿ s own choice might in￿ uence behavior: First, the decision maker has
monetary incentives to reveal his true preferences. Second, imagine a decision maker who prefers a
very e¢ cient, but highly unequal allocation. In a setup with a constant payo⁄ for the decision maker,
choosing the unequal allocation corresponds to "punishing" some of the other subjects while being on
the safe side himself. In contrast, in our experiment, the decision maker himself risks getting a very
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Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001). Since the dictator
can only transfer integer units, the following allocations are possible results of the
game:
Table 1.1: Possible allocations
dictator 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
receiver 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
There are two focal points among these allocations: the allocation (12,0) represents
the most e¢ cient one (and, at the same time, the one a sel￿sh dictator would choose).
An individual with a very strong concern for equality would choose allocation (4,4).
Transferring more than necessary to achieve the equal split allocation (4,4) is hard
to rationalize: the resulting allocations impose an enormous e¢ ciency loss and add
inequality. The dictator game treatment serves as benchmark, ensures comparability
with related studies and measures social preferences.
The veil of ignorance treatment implements the veil of ignorance by introducing role
uncertainty. It is a dictator game with the same 50 % e¢ ciency loss as the dictator
game treatment and additional role uncertainty. Role uncertainty means that ￿rst
every subject decides how many units the dictator will transfer. After this transfer
decision roles (dictator and receiver) are randomly assigned and pairs consisting of
one dictator and one receiver matched. Finally, a subject that has been assigned the
receiver (dictator) role will be paid the receiver￿ s (dictator￿ s) payo⁄ according to his
own decision how many units the dictator will transfer to the receiver. For example,
imagine a subject that has ￿rst decided that the dictator will transfer 4 units. If this
subject then gets assigned the receiver role he will receive a payo⁄ of 1
2 ￿ 4 = 2, his
matched subject in the dictator role will receive 12 ￿ 4 = 8 units. If this subjects
gets assigned the dictator role he will receive a payo⁄ of 8 units, his matched subject
in the receiver role will receive 2 units. It is possible that every subject￿ s decision
is implemented as the dictator￿ s choice (independent of whether the decision-maker
has been assigned the role of dictator or receiver) because each subject also serves
as a dummy player in another subject￿ s decision. Procedural details of our matching
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Implementing the veil of ignorance as described above induces risk and potentially
impartial social preferences. To test whether the veil of ignorance is only a concept
about risk we have to be able to isolate potential impartial social preferences from risk
considerations that jointly determine subjects￿decisions behind the veil of ignorance.
The risk treatment serves exactly this purpose. It di⁄ers from the veil of ignorance
treatment in just one respect. It is a one person game and consequently, basically a
lottery decision: ￿rst, each subject decides how to allocate the pie across the states of
being dictator or being receiver. After that decision each subject is randomly assigned
the role of dictator or receiver with equal probability. In contrast to the veil of ignorance
treatment, there is no second subject who ￿lls in the role that has not been assigned
to the decision-maker. For example, imagine a subject that has ￿rst decided that the
dictator will transfer 4 units. If this subject then gets assigned the receiver role it will
receive a payo⁄of 1
2 ￿4 = 2, 12￿4 = 8 units will not be paid out. If this subjects gets
assigned the dictator role it will receive a payo⁄ of 8 units, 4 units will not be paid
out. Since there is no second subject who is a⁄ected by the decision maker￿ s choice,
the decisions in the risk treatment simply re￿ ect the individual degree of risk aversion
and cannot be in￿ uenced by social preferences.
Table 1.2 summarizes the three treatments.
Table 1.2: The three treatment design
treatment characteristics what is measured?
e¢ ciency role number of
loss uncertainty players
dictator game yes no 2 social preferences
veil of ignorance yes yes 2 impartial social
preferences with risk
risk yes yes 1 risk attitude
There are two reasons that make the e¢ ciency loss an essential feature of our
experimental design: First, in the risk treatment the e¢ ciency loss introduces a cost of
insurance which allows telling apart risk neutral and risk averse subjects as well as risk
averse subjects with di⁄erent degrees of risk aversion. With any e¢ ciency loss, risk
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over all other allocations. For each risk averse subject, we get an approximate measure
of individual risk aversion: the more risk averse a subject is the more units 0 < x < 8
he will transfer. Very strongly risk averse subjects transfer 8 units which results in the
(4,4) allocation that provides full insurance. Without the e¢ ciency loss, all possible
allocations would have an expected payo⁄ of 6 and every risk averse subject would
choose the (6,6) allocation that provides full insurance at no cost. Risk neutral subjects
would be indi⁄erent between all possible allocations and thus might also choose the
(6,6) allocation.
Second, to test whether the di⁄erence principle can also be derived from impartial
social preferences for equal outcomes we have to be able to observe whether less than
in￿nitely risk-averse subjects (i.e. subjects who transfer x < 8 in the risk treatment)
transfer x = 8 in the veil of ignorance treatment. Since the only di⁄erence between the
veil of ignorance and the risk treatment is the existence of the second person a higher
transfer in the veil of ignorance treatment is caused by a concern for equality. With
a 50 % e¢ ciency loss, only few subjects will opt for full, but very costly insurance in
the risk treatment. For all but these very strongly risk averse subjects there is still
room for moving towards a more equal allocation in the veil of ignorance treatment. In
contrast, if there was no e¢ ciency loss, all risk averse subjects would choose the (6,6)
allocation in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment irrespective of whether they
are purely sel￿sh or have impartial social preferences for equality. Only for those risk
neutral subjects who would transfer x < 6 in the risk treatment we could learn whether
they have impartial social preferences for equality behind the veil of ignorance.9
1.2.2 Sessions
Due to matching requirements each subject participated in two of the three treatments:
in the risk treatment and in one of the two two-player treatments, either the dictator
game or the veil of ignorance treatment. At each time of the experiment half of the
9The experimental design cannot distinguish between subjects who are risk neutral and those who
are risk loving. Both will choose the (12,0) allocation. This might be a ￿ aw as, ceteris paribus, a more
risk loving individual will let the dictator transfer less in the veil of ignorance treatment, a decision
that we will interpret to re￿ ect a preference for e¢ ciency. We do not expect many subjects to be risk
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subjects played the risk treatment. These subjects were matched with the other half
of subjects who played one of the two two-player treatments in the same room at the
same time. This matching across treatments has two advantages: ￿rst, not only in the
risk but also in the veil of ignorance and the dictator game treatment every subject￿ s
decision is in fact implemented (and every subject knows this10). We avoid introducing
an additional source of risk in the veil of ignorance treatment, namely whether one￿ s
own decision or the decision of one￿ s matched subject will be implemented. Second,
we maximize the number of observations because we avoid paying passive players. As
a result of the matching, each subject had three sources of payo⁄ at the end of the
session: the payo⁄ from his own risk decision, a payo⁄ from his own decision in one of
the two two-player treatments and a payo⁄from a randomly assigned subject￿ s decision
in one of the two two-player treatments. Subjects were only informed about the last,
additional source of payo⁄ that they could not in￿ uence anyway at the end of the
experiment.
In total we conducted nine sessions. In ￿ve sessions, all subjects played the risk
and the veil of ignorance treatment, though in di⁄erent orders. In the remaining four
sessions, half of the participants ￿rst played the risk and then the veil of ignorance
treatment, while the other half of participants ￿rst played the dictator game and then
the risk treatment. The three treatment orders are depicted in table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Treatment orders
￿rst treatment second treatment number of subjects
risk veil of ignorance 83
veil of ignorance risk 48
dictator game risk 36
Before we pool the data obtained in one speci￿c treatment, but from di⁄erent
treatment orders we have to make sure that there are no order e⁄ects. For the two
treatment orders of the veil of ignorance treatment we use the Mann￿ Whitney test
and for the three treatment orders of the risk treatment we use the Kruskal-Wallis test
10We told decision-makers in the dictator game and the veil of ignorance treatment in the instruc-
tions: "only half of the participants present in this room are taking part in the same experiment as
you do. The other half of the participants is playing another experiment whose payo⁄ does not a⁄ect
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to check whether the distributions of transferred units obtained in di⁄erent treatment
orders are signi￿cantly di⁄erent. Table 1.4 shows that we can pool all veil of ignorance
and risk treatment data respectively for the whole sample as well as for men and
women separately.11 In sum, we collected 131 observations on decisions in the veil
of ignorance treatment, 167 in the risk and 36 in the dictator game treatment. The
complete experimental data are displayed by treatment and sex in Appendix 1.6.2.
Table 1.4: No order e⁄ects
veil of ignorance treatment risk treatment
(Mann-Whitney test*) (Kruskal-Wallis test*)
all p=0.627 (131 obs.) p=0.464 (167 obs.)
men p=0.505 (91 obs.) p=0.816 (108 obs.)
women p=0.810 (40 obs.) p=0.729 (59 obs.)
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
1.2.3 Experimental procedure and subjects
The order of events during each experimental session was the following: Subjects were
welcomed and randomly assigned a cubicle in the laboratory where they took their
decisions in complete anonymity from the other subjects. The random allocation to
a cubicle also determined the individual treatment order. Subjects were handed out
the instructions for their ￿rst treatment and answered several computerized control
questions that tested their understanding of the decision situation. Only after pro-
viding and explaining the right answers on the computer screen, we proceeded to the
decision stage of the ￿rst treatment. After all subjects had made their ￿rst decision,
we announced that there would be a second and at the same time last experiment. To
avoid income e⁄ects we did not give subjects any feedback on the result of the ￿rst
treatment before they were paid at the end of the whole session. The second treatment
followed with the same procedures. We ￿nished each experimental session by asking
subjects to answer a questionnaire on their demographic characteristics, the strategies
they had used and their expectations concerning the behavior and risk attitudes of the
11We present test results also by sex as gender di⁄erences will be important for the interpretation
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other subjects.
A translated version of the instructions and the corresponding control questions can
be found in Appendix 1.6.1. The experiment was programmed using the experimen-
tal software zTree (Fischbacher, 1999) and conducted at the experimental laboratory
of the SFB 504 at the University of Mannheim, Germany in November 2005. The
experiments lasted about one hour and subjects earned about 16 Euros on average.
All 167 subjects12 were university students with a large variety of subjects. The main
characteristics of the subjects are displayed in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5: Composition of treatments
dictator game risk veil of ignorance
treatment treatment treatment
number of observations 36 167 131
sex* 19 (F)/17(M) 59(F)/108(M) 40(F)/91(M)
mean age 23.56 23.77 23.82
knowledge in economics** 66.67 % 64.67 % 64.12 %
* F stands for female, M for male
** includes students studying economics or business administration as minor or major
1.3 Hypotheses
Let us ￿rst brie￿ y turn to the growing literature on gender di⁄erences in risk attitudes
and social preferences. Reviewing the vast economic literature on gender di⁄erences
in risk preferences Eckel and Grossman (2006) conclude that women are characterized
by a higher degree of risk aversion than men in ￿eld studies, while the results from
laboratory experiments are less consistent. Similarly, Croson and Gneezy￿ s (2004)
survey summarizes that there is clear evidence that men are more risk-taking than
women in most tasks and most populations. Camerer (2003, p.64) summarizes evidence
on the e⁄ect of gender on social preferences and concludes that evidence is mixed.13
12We admitted only an even number of subjects to the experiment but one subject left during
the course of the experiment. His role was ￿lled by one of the experimenters and the corresponding
observations were deleted.
13Considering dictator games, for example, Eckel and Grossman (1998) ￿nd that women on average
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However the studies that are most closely related to our dictator game and veil
of ignorance treatment indicate that gender di⁄erences are likely to matter in our
experimental setup. In Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) subjects play dictator games
with di⁄erent levels of e¢ ciency losses. They ￿nd that when it is relatively expensive
to give, women are more generous than men. As the price of giving decreases, men
begin to give more than women. With our 50 % e¢ ciency loss, women are signi￿cantly
more generous than men. The following two studies are, to some extent, related to
our veil of ignorance treatment: they have an impartial decision maker as we do, but,
in contrast to our study, the decision maker￿ s payo⁄ is ￿xed and independent of his
own choice. Fehr, Naef and Schmidt (2006) replicate Engelmann and Strobel￿ s (2004)
experiment and ￿nd that women choose the most egalitarian allocation signi￿cantly
more often than men. Dickinson and Tiefenthaler (2002) play an experiment with a
disinterested third-party decision maker in which women are signi￿cantly more likely
to choose an allocation resulting in equal payo⁄s while men are more likely to choose
the most e¢ cient allocation.
To check for the existence of gender di⁄erences in our experimental setup we for-
mulate Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1
Women and men do not behave signi￿cantly di⁄erent in any of our treatments.
If we should reject hypothesis 1 gender di⁄erences in risk attitudes and social pref-
erences are likely to a⁄ect all further results on di⁄erences between treatments. Con-
sequently, we should then analyze the following hypotheses not only for both sexes
jointly, but also for men and women separately.
Exploiting our three treatment design we can ￿rst compare transfers in the dictator
game and the veil of ignorance treatment that have the same trade o⁄between equality
and e¢ ciency.
present results of a dictator game in which signi￿cantly fewer men than women give non-zero amounts.
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Hypothesis 2
There is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between social preferences and impartial social
preferences with risk that are measured in the dictator game and the veil of ignorance
treatment respectively.
If we should reject hypothesis 2, we will ask next whether the observed di⁄erence
can be completely explained by risk aversion: Is the veil of ignorance only a concept
that introduces risk? Or, in contrast, are impartial social preferences an additional
motivation behind the veil of ignorance?
Hypothesis 3
There is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between risk preferences and impartial social pref-
erences with risk that are measured in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment
respectively.
The only di⁄erence between the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment is whether
a second person exists who is a⁄ected by the decision maker￿ s transfer decision. Since
the degree of risk is held constant, the two treatments di⁄er only in whether impartial
social preferences can possibly motivate the observed transfer decisions. If we cannot
reject hypothesis 3, the thought experiment of a veil of ignorance has correctly been
perceived as a concept inducing only risk aversion. The only way to derive Rawls￿
di⁄erence principle is to assume in￿nite risk aversion. In contrast, if hypothesis 3 is
rejected, impartial social preferences are a signi￿cant motivation behind the veil of
ignorance. Consequently, the di⁄erence principle and maximin preferences can also be
considered the result of impartial social preferences combined with any degree of risk
aversion (assuming that impartial social preferences induce an increased concern for
equality).14
14While the term "veil of ignorance" was coined by Rawls, Harsanyi (1953, 1955) already used the
same thought experiment. Harsanyi interprets value judgments made behind the veil of ignorance
to re￿ ect choices involving just risk and assumes that agents are risk neutral. Consequently, he
predicts e¢ ciency seeking behavior to prevail behind the veil of ignorance. In terms of our experiment,
Harsanyi￿ s argument would be supported if we found that subjects do not transfer any units in the risk
treatment (risk neutrality) and if di⁄erences in subjects￿behavior across the risk and the impartiality
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This is investigated by hypothesis 4: given that impartial social preferences intro-
duce an additional motive, do they induce an increased concern for equality or for
e¢ ciency? To what extent does a veil of ignorance like situation induce maximin
preferences as predicted by Rawls?
Hypothesis 4




In our experiment, women are signi￿cantly more risk averse than men and choose
more equal (and thus less e¢ cient) allocations than men.
In total, we had 108 male (65 %) and 59 female (35 %) subjects. Table 1.6 displays
average transferred units by sex and treatment as well as test results by treatment for
whether medians and distributions of transferred units di⁄er for men and women.
Table 1.6: Gender di⁄erences by treatment
treatment mean men mean women Mann-Whitney Median test*
test*
dictator game 0.76 (17 obs.) 2.37 (19 obs.) p=0.061 p=0.091**
risk 2.72 (108 obs.) 3.69 (59 obs.) p=0.014 p=0.016
veil of ignorance 2.81 (91 obs.) 5.00 (40 obs.) p=0.000 p=0.000
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
**: In the dictator game treatment, the median corresponds to keeping all 12 units. To obtain
a test result we treat observations that equal the median like observations greater instead of
lower than the median as we do in all other Median tests reported.
In sum, we observe strikingly di⁄erent transfer behaviors of male and female sub-
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signi￿cantly for men and women both in the risk and in the veil of ignorance treat-
ment. The same is true for medians. In the veil of ignorance treatment, the absolute
di⁄erence in means is largest and amounts to 2.2 units with 8 units being the maximal
reasonable transfer amount. Women transfer more and thus are more concerned about
equality while men care more about e¢ ciency. Gender di⁄erences in the risk treatment
are smaller in absolute amounts, but strongly signi￿cant: they indicate that, on aver-
age, women are more risk averse than men. Due to the small number of observations
medians and distributions are only weakly marginally di⁄erent in the dictator game
treatment. Still, on average male dictators transfer less than one out of 8 units, female
dictators transfer nearly 2.5 units. Furthermore, about 70 % of male dictators keep the
whole pie, while only 37 % of women do. Carlsson, Daruvala and Johansson-Stenman
(2005) run two di⁄erent treatments to measure a given individual￿ s risk and inequality
aversion in the absence of risk. Similar to our results, they ￿nd that female subjects
are more risk averse and more inequality averse than men.
In sum, male and female subjects do behave signi￿cantly di⁄erent in our experiment.
Consequently, we will focus on analyzing the data for men and women separately.
We will also present a joint analysis for the sake of completeness and to guarantee
comparability of our results in the dictator game treatment to other dictator game
studies.15
1.4.2 Comparison of dictator game and veil of ignorance treat-
ment
We now turn to hypothesis 2 and discuss whether stated preferences in front of and
behind the veil of ignorance di⁄er. If they do, we might want to question the use of
people￿ s stated social preferences from surveys and alike as a basis for "just" policy
15Our results in the dictator game treatment are very close to those of other dictator games that
vary the price of giving. In our dictator game treatment, subjects give away 13 % of the pie on
average. With the same 50 % e¢ ciency loss and a similar pie size, they transfer 10 % in Andreoni
and Vesterlund (2001) and 21 % in Andreoni and Miller (2002). In Fisman, Kariv and Markovits
(2007), for an e¢ ciency loss of 30 % or above, 60 % of subjects transfer less than 5 % of the pie,
17 % transfer 5-15 % of the pie, 10 % 15-25 % of the pie and the remaining subjects transfer more.
The corresponding ￿gures in our dictator game treatment are very similar: 53 %, 17 % and 11 %,
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design. Our data would then suggest using impartially stated social preferences.
Result 2
There is a large and signi￿cant di⁄erence between social preferences and impartial
social preferences with risk. Subjects transfer signi￿cantly more in the veil of ignorance
than in the dictator game treatment.
Table 1.7: Test results for hypothesis 2
mean dictator mean veil of Mann-Whitney Median test*
game treatment ignorance treatment test*
all 1.61 (36 obs.) 3.48 (131 obs.) p=0.000 p=0.000
men 0.76 (17 obs.) 2.81 (91 obs.) p=0.003 p=0.018
women 2.37 (19 obs.) 5.00 (40 obs.) p=0.002 p=0.000
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
Test results in Table 1.7 reject hypothesis 2: medians and distributions of units
transferred di⁄er signi￿cantly for the pooled data and for men and women separately.
OLS regression results using the pooled dictator game and veil of ignorance treatment
data in the ￿rst two columns of Table 1.8 con￿rm the test results: both men and women
transfer signi￿cantly more in the veil of ignorance than in the dictator game treatment,
about 2 units on average.16 In both treatments, women transfer signi￿cantly more than
men, a bit but not signi￿cantly more so in the veil of ignorance treatment.
One would have expected hypothesis 2 to be true only if (i) experimental subjects
were risk neutral and (ii) they would behave impartially even if their role is known,
i.e. if experimental subjects would not exhibit any egoism or subconscious self-serving
bias in the dictator game treatment. Thus, the next step is to ￿gure out where the
signi￿cant di⁄erences between the dictator game treatment and the veil of ignorance
treatment stem from: Are they due to risk aversion only, the prevalence of impartial
social preferences in the veil of ignorance treatment as opposed to egoism in the dictator
16Curtis (1979) also compares individual distributional preferences in front of and behind the veil
of ignorance but adds the issue of meritocracy: subjects have to decide how to distribute 3 dollars
between a high and a low scorer in a motor skill test. When subjects know whether they are the high
or the low scorer, 13 % behave consistently with maximin preferences, when they do not know 52 %
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Table 1.8: Pooled OLS
dependent variable: dictator game and veil of risk and veil of ignorance
transfer amount ignorance treatment data treatment data
explanatory variables* coe¢ cient p-value** coe¢ cient p-value**
female 1.606 0.054 1.091 0.018
VoI 2.064 0.000 -0.059 0.901
female x VoI 0.741 0.443 1.308 0.053
sequence risk - VoI -0.121 0.826 0.616 0.911
sequence VoI - risk - - -0.166 0.802
VoI x sequence VoI** - risk - - 0.343 0.651
economist 0.242 0.599 0.397 0.262
age (in years) 0.028 0.961 -0.198 0.708
age squared 0.001 0.949 0.005 0.609
constant -0.439 0.953 0.005 0.609
N 167 298
R2 0.176 0.087
*: female = 1 if female, 0 if male; VoI = 1 if veil of ignorance treatment, 0 else;
risk = 1 if risk treatment, 0 else; economist = 1 if economist, 0 else
**: based on robust standard errors
game treatment, or a combination of both? In the risk treatment, 68 % of all subjects
(80 % of female and 61 % of male subjects) transfer a positive amount despite the
large e¢ ciency loss occurred. The average transfer amount is 3.1 for all subjects, 3.7
for women and 2.7 for men. The majority of our subjects clearly are risk averse.
1.4.3 Comparison of risk and veil of ignorance treatment
Can risk aversion account for the complete observed di⁄erence in transfers between the
dictator game and the veil of ignorance treatment? Or do impartial social preferences
additionally contribute to it?
Result 3
For female subjects impartial social preferences are a second signi￿cant motivation
behind the veil of ignorance besides risk, while this is not true for men.
Table 1.9 compares all observations obtained in the risk and the veil of ignorance
treatment. Analyzing only the data that are pooled for both sexes, we would con-
clude that hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected: both medians and distributions of transferIs the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 26
Table 1.9: Test results for hypothesis 3
mean risk mean veil of Mann-Whitney Median test*
treatment ignorance treatment test*
all 3.07 (167 obs.) 3.48 (131 obs.) p=0.203 p=0.484
men 2.72 (108 obs.) 2.81 (91 obs.) p=0.773 p=0.980
women 3.69 (59 obs.) 5.00 (40 obs.) p=0.011 p=0.047
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
amounts do not di⁄er signi￿cantly across the two treatments. The veil of ignorance
treatment dummy is not signi￿cant in the right part of Table 1.8 that presents OLS
regression results for pooling all risk and veil of ignorance treatment data. However,
taking a closer look at the data we ￿nd that there are striking gender di⁄erences. While
hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected for men at all, it actually can be rejected for women.
For the female subjects, medians and distributions of transfer amounts do di⁄er signif-
icantly in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment. The regression results in Table
1.8 document that women transfer signi￿cantly (1.3 units) more in the veil of ignorance
treatment than in the risk treatment.
In sum, for female subjects impartial social preferences are a major motivation
behind the veil of ignorance, while this is not true for men. Impartial social preferences
seem to increase equality concerns.
To check Rawls￿prediction that maximin preferences prevail behind the veil of
ignorance, Table 1.10 categorizes the data according to "strong types", i.e. the share
of subjects who decide in favor of full e¢ ciency or full equality in each of the two
treatments.
Table 1.10: Strong types
risk treatment veil of ignorance treatment
participants choosing percentage number percentage number
full e¢ ciency all 32.3 % 54/167 all 27.5 % 36/131
men 38.9 % 42/108 men 35.2 % 32/91
women 20.3 % 12/59 women 10.0 % 4/40
full equality, all 4.2 % 7/167 all 13.7 % 18/131
full insurance men 3.7 % 4/108 men 8.8 % 8/91
women 5.1 % 3/59 women 25.0 % 10/40Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 27
Result 4
In the veil of ignorance treatment, only 8.8 % of men and 25.0 % of women act
according to maximin preferences. Still, for women impartial social preferences clearly
induce a concern for equality.
We observe that nearly all subjects react to the large e¢ ciency loss in the risk
treatment: only very few subjects choose full insurance by equalizing payo⁄s across
states. In the veil of ignorance treatment, the share of subjects choosing full equality
increases substantially, it doubles for men and is ￿ve times as high for women. Still,
support for Rawl￿ s di⁄erence principle is only limited: 8.8 % of men and 25.0 % of
women choose full equality of payo⁄s. Related experiments that elicit paid impartial
decisions behind the veil of ignorance also ￿nd low support for maximin preferences.
In Carlsson, Gupta and Johansson-Stenman (2003) and Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson
and Daruvala (2002) only 20 % and 19 % of subjects act in a way that is compatible with
the di⁄erence principle. In Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey (1987), who investigate
paid group decisions, no group ever chooses an income distribution that maximizes
the lowest income. Maximizing the average income plus a ￿ oor constraint is the most
popular principle for choosing among income distributions. In contrast, in Curtis (1979)
52 % of subjects behave according to maximin preferences behind the veil of ignorance,
in Mitchell et al. (1993) with unpaid decisions and compulsory participation between
65 % and 83 % of subjects (for di⁄ering degrees of meritocracy) opt for the di⁄erence
principle.
In our experiment, a bit more than one third of men go for full e¢ ciency in both the
risk and the veil of ignorance treatment. In sharp contrast, the share of women opting
for full e¢ ciency halves in the veil of ignorance treatment. Compared to the situation
in the one-person risk treatment, full e¢ ciency now implies maximal inequality. All
these ￿ndings underline major di⁄erences in the behavior of men and women: they
show that in our experiment, women exhibit impartial social preferences for equality
in a much stronger way than men.
The results presented above are con￿rmed by a within subject analysis where we
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(and thus skip risk treatment data from the dictator game treatment - risk treatment
sequence). Applying a Wilcoxon signed rank test to the pooled within subject data
(131 observations) yields p=0.037 (two-sided), i.e. distributions of transfer amounts
di⁄er signi￿cantly in the risk and the veil of ignorance treatment. This result is purely
caused by the behavior of female subjects. A two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test
reveals that female subjects transfer signi￿cantly di⁄erent amounts in the risk and veil
of ignorance treatment (p=0.006) while men do not (p=0.790).
Table 1.11 classi￿es subjects according to three "weak types", namely whether an
individual does not react at all to the existence of the second person in the veil of
ignorance treatment, whether it opts for more equality or for more e¢ ciency as soon
as the second person shows up.
Table 1.11: Within subject analysis
subjects who transfer ... all men women
the same amount in the risk 44 % 53 % 22.5 %
and the veil of ignorance treatment
more in the veil of ignorance 35 % 24 % 60 %
treatment
less in the veil of ignorance 21 % 23 % 17.5 %
treatment
number of observations 131 91 40
For more than half of the male subjects the existence of the second person does
not add impartial social preferences as a motive, while this is only true for less than
1/4 of female subjects.17 For those male subjects for whom impartial social preferences
matter their e⁄ect is equally likely to point in the direction of an increased e¢ ciency
or an equality motive. 60 % of women transfer more in the veil of ignorance treatment
than in the risk treatment (3.1 units on average), but only about 1/4 of men do (4.0
units on average). These ￿ndings con￿rm that for the vast majority of female subjects
the veil of ignorance induces impartial social preferences for equality besides inducing
risk. Our results for those 14 out of 131 subjects (7 men and 7 women) who do not
17Subjects who transfer the same amount in both treatments could also have a degree of risk
aversion and impartial social preferences that imply the same transfer amount in the veil of ignorance
treatment. While we cannot totally disapprove this possibility, we can be sure that these subjects￿
decisions are, on average, not driven by strong equality concerns: they transfer only 2.2 out of 8
reasonably possible units in the veil of ignorance treatment.Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 29
opt for full insurance in the risk treatment, but choose full equality in the veil of
ignorance treatment imply that the di⁄erence principle can be derived from impartial
social preferences for equality and does not require that subjects are in￿nitely risk
averse. Impartial social preferences for equality are even a more prominent motive for
choosing the maximin allocation in the veil of ignorance treatment. Only 3 subjects
act according to maximin preferences in the veil of ignorance treatment because they
are extremely risk averse, i.e. transfer 8 units in both the veil of ignorance and the
risk treatment. These results contrast the utilitarians￿claim that maximin preferences
necessarily represent preferences with in￿nite risk aversion. We should keep in mind,
however, that overall support for the di⁄erence principle is only limited.
While our results for women demonstrate that impartial social preferences for equal-
ity are one important motive behind the veil of ignorance there are also subjects - 23 %
of men and 17.5 % of women - with impartial social preferences for e¢ ciency.18 Insofar
our results are related to those of Engelmann and Strobel￿ s (2004) taxation games that
document that both concerns for e¢ ciency and maximin preferences are important
motives for impartial decision makers.
1.5 Conclusion
Rawls￿claim that a truly just allocation of resources can only be based on impartial
judgments made behind the veil of ignorance is as intuitively attractive as disputable:
democratic institutions rest upon the assumption that competition of vested interests
is able to balance interests appropriately. It was not the aim of this paper to comment
on this. Our experimental results simply show that preferences stated in front of
and behind the veil of ignorance di⁄er signi￿cantly. Behind the veil of ignorance,
18In our data, subjects who transfer less in the veil of ignorance treatment than in the risk treatment
are substantially more risk averse than those who transfer more. A possible explanation for why
subjects transfer less could be that subjects maximize the sum of their own and the second person￿ s
expected utility but do not have any distributional concerns. Subjects would then give away less
(more) in the veil of ignorance treatment if they perceive themselves as more (less) risk averse than
the average participant. In the ￿nal questionnaire we asked our subjects to assess whether they had
transferred more or less than the average participant in the risk treatment. We run an OLS regression
to explain the di⁄erence in transferred units in the veil of ignorance and the risk treatment. Controlling
for subject characteristics, the individual perception of own risk aversion compared to average risk
aversion is not signi￿cant. Consequently, our data re￿ ect distributional concerns.Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 30
subjects prefer more equal distributions, but only a minority of subjects acts according
to maximin preferences. Consequently, support for Rawls￿di⁄erence principle is far
from being unanimous. On a technical level, we have presented an experimental design
that separates the e⁄ects of risk and impartial social preferences behind the veil of
ignorance. We have found that men prefer more equal distributions mostly for insurance
purposes. In contrast, women￿ s choice of more equal allocations is also due impartial
social preferences that value equality per se. Most importantly, our results for those
subjects who act according to maximin preferences in the veil of ignorance, but not in
the risk treatment challenge the utilitarians￿claim that behind the veil of ignorance
maximin preferences necessarily represent preferences with in￿nite risk aversion.
Our results also contribute to the growing literature on gender di⁄erences in eco-
nomic behavior. Gender e⁄ects in our data are strong. They imply that women are
more risk averse than men. Furthermore, when there is a trade o⁄ between equality
and e¢ ciency women seem to have stronger preferences for equal allocations while men
have stronger preferences for e¢ cient allocations.
1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Instructions and control questions
Both instructions and control questions were originally in German. The translated
instructions and control questions presented below are those of the veil of ignorance
treatment. The instructions and control questions for the dictator game and the risk
treatment are structured and phrased in the same way with just one exception: to
explain the risk treatment in the most natural and easiest possible way the instructions
did not mention the state of being participant A (dictator) or B (receiver), but described
the two possible states by throwing a dice and getting either an even or an odd number.
The instructions of the dictator game and the risk treatment are available from the
author upon request.Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 31
Instructions
General explanations concerning the experiment
Welcome to this economic experiment.
If you read the following instructions carefully, you will be able to earn an amount of
money that depends on your own decisions. Therefore, it is very important that you
read these explanations carefully. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to
ask us. Please raise your hand, and we will come to your seat.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to the other participants,
to use cell phones or to start any programs on the computer. The neglect of
these rules will lead to the exclusion from the experiment and all payments.
During the experiment we talk about points instead of Euros. Your total income will
therefore be calculated in points ￿rst. At the end of the experiment, the total amount
of points obtained during the experiment will be converted in Euros at an exchange
rate of
1 point = 1 Euro.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earned income that is the result
of your decision in cash.
On the next pages we will explain the exact course of the experiment.
The Experiment
In this experiment there are two participants, A and B.
Participant A has an initial endowment of 12 points, whereas participant B has an
initial endowment of 0 points. Participant A can transfer every integer amount between
0 and 12 points (0 and 12 included) to participant B. Every transfer leads to the loss
of half of the transferred points. This means that participant B receives only
half of a point for every full point participant A transfers to him. ParticipantIs the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 32
B does not have any in￿ uence on the decision of participant A and the course of the
game apart from being paid half of the points transferred to him by participant A at
the end of the experiment. Participant A will be paid the amount of points that he
does not transfer.
The following table shows all possible distributions of points for participant A and B
at the end of the experiment:
A transfers to B 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A￿ s points 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
B￿ s points 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
The course of the experiment is the following:
Stage 1:
First, you have to decide how many points participant A transfers to participant B. This
can be done by entering the number of points that are transferred from participant A to
participant B on the following screen and pushing the ￿OK￿ -Button afterwards. Note
that at this stage you do not know yet whether you will be a participant A
or a participant B in stage 2. The computer has already randomly chosen another
participant with whom you form a pair.
[screen]
Stage 2:
A random selection determines whether you are assigned the role of participant A
or the one of participant B. When you are assigned the role of participant A, the
participant assigned to you has the role of participant B. When you are assigned the role
of participant B, the participant assigned to you has the role of participant A. Every
pair therefore consists of one real participant A and one real participant B.
Both during the experiment and afterwards neither you nor the participant assigned
to you know who the respective partner is.Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 33
Stage 3:
Your decision in stage 1 will be realized in any case, independent from
whether you are assigned to the role of participant A or B. (This is possible
because only half of the participants present in this room are taking part in the same
experiment as you do. The other half of the participants is playing another experiment
whose payo⁄ does not a⁄ect you at all. You are assigned a participant from this other
half.)
Example 1: You decide that A transfers 5 points to B. B therefore obtains 5:2=2.5
points and A keeps 12-5=7 points. Afterwards, it is decided by drawing lots that
you are participant B. Your decision is implemented: You obtain 2.5 points. The
participant assigned to you obtains 7 points.
Example 2: You decide that A transfers 5 points to B. B therefore obtains 5:2=2.5
points and A keeps 12-5=7 points. Afterwards, it is decided by drawing lots that you
are participant A. Your decision is implemented: You obtain 7 points. The participant
assigned to you obtains 2.5 points.
This experiment is played only once. At the end of the experiment all participants A
and B are paid their income in cash.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to your seat to answer
your question.
Control questions
Question 1: You decide that A transfers 3 points to B. It is decided by drawing lots
that you are participant A.
How many points does B get?
How many Euros will you be paid?
How many Euros will your randomly assigned participant B be paid?
Question 2: You decide that A transfers 6 points to B. It is decided by drawing lots
that you are participant B.Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 34
How many points does B get?
How many Euros will you be paid?
How many Euros will your randomly assigned participant A be paid?
1.6.2 Data by treatment and sex


































male (N=17) female (N=19)Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? 35



































male (N=108) female (N=59)


































male (N=91) female (N=40)Chapter 2
An experimental test of the
deterrence hypothesis￿
2.1 Introduction
That crime has to be punished seems to be universally accepted. The purpose and level
of punishment, however, are controversial. Immanuel Kant advocated punishment to
re-establish justice, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel stressed that ill has to be retaliated
with ill. Both philosophers regard punishment as a mean to establish justice. Becker￿ s
(1968) deterrence hypothesis is the classic economic contribution to the debate on
punishment. According to Becker the purpose of punishment is to (e¢ ciently) deter
individuals from committing crimes. To achieve deterrence Becker relies on the power
of pure deterrent incentives such as the severity and probability of punishment. The
deterrence hypothesis states that crime rates fall in the severity and in the probability
of punishment.
Our laboratory experiment directly tests the deterrence hypothesis in a controlled
environment that permits to exogenously vary deterrent incentives, i.e. detection prob-
ability and level of punishment. For this purpose we use a straightforward context,
namely subjects have the possibility to steal from another subject￿ s payo⁄. They can-
not only decide whether to steal or not to steal, but also how much to steal. We ask a
￿This chapter is joint work with Christina Strassmair from the University of Munich.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 37
very basic, but important question: do deterrent incentives work?
In order to answer this question we have chosen one of the simplest possible designs:
a modi￿ed dictator game. Two agents, A and B, are randomly matched. Agent A is
a passive agent and has a higher initial endowment than agent B. Agent B can decide
how much to take away (steal) from A￿ s initial endowment. With probability 1 ￿ p,
this amount is transferred from A to B. With probability p ("detection probability"),
however, this amount is not transferred and a ￿xed ￿ne f is deducted from B￿ s initial
endowment if B has chosen a strictly positive transfer amount.
We conduct six di⁄erent treatments in which we vary detection probability p and
￿ne f. Our benchmark treatment T1 sets p = f = 0. Treatments T2, T3 and
T4 investigate the range of small and intermediate deterrent incentives, i.e. levels of
incentives such that taking agent A￿ s whole initial endowment pays o⁄ in expectation.
Treatment T5 is characterized by a combination of p and f such that taking everything
generates about the same expected payo⁄as taking nothing. In treatment T6, however,
the expected payo⁄ from taking everything is substantially smaller than the one from
taking nothing. Each subject participates in two di⁄erent treatments sequentially.
This design permits both an across subjects and a within subject analysis of taking
behavior. In other words, we can analyze both di⁄erent regimes and regime changes
with the data at hand.
Our very simple experimental design has three main advantages. For subjects, the
task is easy to understand. Our design allows testing the isolated e⁄ect of incentives.
And our design captures some crucial features of many crimes: the victim is rather
passive. It cannot set the severity of punishment and - to a large extent - the detection
probability. In case of theft, the stolen amount is a good predictor of the thief￿ s bene￿t
and the victim￿ s cost.
The results of our across subjects analysis clearly reject the deterrence hypothesis:
the average taken amount is not monotonically (weakly) decreasing in p and f. In con-
trast, we ￿nd that incentives may back￿re: on average subjects take signi￿cantly more
in treatments with intermediate deterrent incentives than in the absence of incentives.
Only very strong incentives deter. Both our across and within subjects results can beAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 38
explained by a model of two types: sel￿sh subjects who react to deterrent incentives as
predicted by the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects who take more when
incentives are introduced or raised until incentives reach a very high level. Possible
explanations for the behavior of fair-minded subjects are crowding out of fairness con-
cerns by extrinsic incentives or fairness preferences with respect to expected outcomes.
Only lasting crowding out of fairness concerns can explain the order e⁄ects in our data:
many fair subjects take more in a given treatment if this treatment was preceded by a
treatment with stronger incentives than if it was preceded by a treatment with weaker
incentives. Furthermore, we ￿nd that p and f seem to be interchangeable instruments
in achieving deterrence.
Since we obtain our data from neutrally framed experiments (i.e. we talk about
"transfer decisions" instead of "stealing" and about "minus points" instead of a "￿ne"),
one may question the applicability of our results for "real life crime". In real life, crime
and deterrent incentives often have a strong moral connotation, and policy makers may
make use of that. Still, we consciously use a neutral frame because our primary aim
is to test the economic approach to crime. Its core, the deterrence hypothesis, relies
on pure incentive e⁄ects that are independent of any frame. In Becker￿ s (1968) model
framing might ceteris paribus a⁄ect B￿ s decision, but not the comparative statics with
respect to p and f. Whatever the frame the taken amount should be monotonically
decreasing in p and f. To measure the e⁄ect of moral costs we run some additional
"morally" framed sessions in which we label transfers as stealing and talk about a ￿ne
instead of minus points. In these sessions, we still observe back￿ring of incentives.
Becker￿ s seminal paper has triggered numerous theoretical extensions as well as
￿eld studies testing its external validity.19 At large the empirical literature implies
that punishment reduces crime, but variations in detection probability and severity of
punishment explain only a small part of the variation in crime (see Glaeser, 1999). This
may be caused by methodic problems that arise when using ￿eld data. Usually only
aggregate data are available which results in simultaneity bias20 and omitted variable
19Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000a) provide comprehensive overviews on the eco-
nomic theory of optimal law enforcement. Eide (2000) and Glaeser (1999) survey empirical studies of
the deterrence hypothesis.
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problems. Field data often report the behavior of o⁄enders only and not that of the
general population. Furthermore, measurement error is widespread as not all crime is
reported. All these problems do not exist in the laboratory.
Our experiment is related to the experimental literature on tax evasion that explic-
itly addresses deterrence. The tax evasion setups clearly di⁄er from ours though: in
many settings subjects do not in￿ uence other subjects￿payo⁄s at all, in other settings
collected taxes are used for public good provision or redistribution of resources among
a group of subjects. In contrast, in our setup a stealing subject directly hurts another
subject which seems to be a crucial feature of many crimes.21 Laboratory experiments
on criminal behavior other than tax evasion are scarce. While we explicitly test whether
deterrent incentives work, other studies on criminal behavior simply assume that deter-
rent incentives work and focus on more elaborate issues. Falk and Fischbacher (2002)
explore the in￿ uence of social interaction phenomena on committing a crime. Bohnet
and Cooter (2005), Tyran and Feld (2006), and Galbiati and Vertrova (2005) investi-
gate whether law can act as "expressive law", i.e. prevent crime by activating norms
that prohibit committing a crime. Tyran and Feld (2006) also compare the e⁄ects of
exogenously imposed and endogenously chosen incentives in a public good setting.
In addition, there is a growing economic literature that investigates the e⁄ectiveness
of incentives in general. Some laboratory and ￿eld experiments document that (small)
incentives back￿re and thus challenge the belief in the e⁄ectiveness of incentives.22
Frey and Jegen (2001) stress that introducing incentives has two countervailing e⁄ects:
besides the standard relative price e⁄ect, incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation.
With small incentives the relative price e⁄ect is small and the latter, counterproductive
e⁄ect may dominate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and
procedure, section 3 the behavioral predictions. Across and within subjects results are
21Torgler (2002) reviews the experimental literature on tax evasion and concludes that evidence on
the e⁄ectiveness of deterrent incentives is rather mixed (p.662).
22Bowles (2007), Fehr and Falk (2002) and Frey and Jegen (2001) survey the economic literature on
crowding out of intrinsic motivation. The origins of this literature are in psychology, see for example
Deci (1971) and Lepper, Greene and Nisbett (1973). Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999) provide a
meta-analysis of more than 100 psychological studies on the e⁄ect of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic
motivation.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 40
Figure 2.1: Structure of the game
summarized and discussed in section 4. In section 5 we check the robustness of our
results by presenting results from sessions with a moral frame. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Experimental design and procedure
Consider one of the simplest possible games of stealing with two agents, A and B.
Agent A is initially endowed with wA, and agent B is initially endowed with wB, where
wA > wB.23 While agent A is passive, agent B can take any amount x 2 [0;wA] from
agent A￿ s endowment. If B does not take anything, i.e. x = 0, agents A and B both
receive their initial endowments wA and wB. If B takes a strictly positive amount
(x > 0), with probability (1 ￿ p) 2 [0;1] the taken amount x is indeed transferred from
A to B; with probability p, however, x is not transferred and, on top of that, agent B
has to pay a ￿xed ￿ne f. We use a ￿xed ￿ne that is independent of the taken amount
to keep the design as simple as possible. The structure of the game is summarized in
Figure 2.1.
Since we focus on pure incentive e⁄ects on B￿ s behavior we vary the detection
23wA > wB allows to distinguish between subjects who have a preference for fair (equal) outcomes
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probability p and the ￿ne f across di⁄erent treatments and ￿x wA and wB at levels 90
and 50, respectively. Table 2.1 presents the treatments.
Table 2.1: Treatments
Treatment p f B￿ s expected payo⁄ B￿ s expected payo⁄ Level of incentives
given x = 0 given x = 90
T1 0.0 0 50 140 zero
T2 0.6 6 50 82.4 small
T3 0.5 25 50 82.5 small
T4 0.6 20 50 74 intermediate
T5 0.7 40 50 49 high
T6 0.8 40 50 36 very high
Treatment T1, our benchmark treatment, implements no deterrent incentives. It is
simply the mirror image of a dictator game.24 In all other treatments strictly positive
detection probabilities and ￿nes are implemented. We categorize the intensity of incen-
tives according to B￿ s expected payo⁄ from taking agent A￿ s whole initial endowment.
As Table 2.1 shows the level of incentives is weakly increasing in treatment order. In
treatments T2, T3 and T4 taking everything pays o⁄ in expectation. Treatment T5
is characterized by a combination of p and f such that taking the maximum possible
amount generates about the same expected payo⁄ as taking nothing. In treatment T6
the expected payo⁄ from taking everything is strictly smaller than the one of taking
nothing. Since the same intensity of incentives is implemented by di⁄erent values of p
and f in treatments T2 and T3, we can analyze whether p and f are interchangeable
instruments in achieving deterrence, at least for this particular level of incentives.
Each experimental session consisted of three parts: two of the treatments described
above and a dictator game.25 After these three parts participants ￿lled out a question-
naire eliciting data on their age, sex and subject of studies. We used a paid Holt and
Laury (2002) procedure to elicit subjects￿risk preferences.26 The conducted sessions
24Here, subjects can decide how much to take away from (instead of to give to) another agent in a
purely distributional context without any strategic considerations.
25In the dictator game, the dictator could give any amount of his initial endowment of 90 to
a passive agent with an initial endowment of 50. The chosen amount may indicate the dictator￿ s
aversion to advantageous inequity. However, the donated amount might be a⁄ected by the treatments
played in part 1 and part 2.
26The translated table and a brief report on the observed levels of risk aversion can be found in
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are presented in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Session plan
Session Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Questionnaire Number of
participants
T1T3 T1 T3 DG Yes 38
T3T1 T3 T1 DG Yes 38
T2T3 T2 T3 DG Yes 18
T3T2 T3 T2 DG Yes 20
T2T4 T2 T4 DG Yes 38
T4T2 T4 T2 DG Yes 36
T5T6 T5 T6 DG Yes 32
T6T5 T6 T5 DG Yes 38
* includes a Holt and Laury (2002) table
At the beginning of each session, participants were told that one randomly picked
part out of the three would be paid for all of them. After each part only the instructions
for the following part were handed out. Subjects did not receive any feedback before
the end of the experiment. They were matched according to a perfect stranger design,
i.e. a couple matched once is never matched again in the following parts. Those
subjects randomly chosen to be agents B in part 1 remained agents B in part 2 and
were dictators in part 3. Consequently, passive subjects remained passive throughout
all three parts of the session.27
This design o⁄ers the possibility to analyze the observed behavior in two di⁄erent
ways. First, we can compare behavior in part 1 across di⁄erent treatments. This is
the cleanest comparison because individual behavior in part 1 is not in￿ uenced by any
preplay. Second, we can analyze how agents B adapt their behavior to the change in
incentives from part 1 to part 2. Since the structure of the model is very simple we
assume that a change in behavior from part 1 to part 2 is stimulated by the change of
incentives rather than learning.
Our experimental sessions were run in November 2006 and March 2007 at the
experimental laboratory of the SFB 504 in Mannheim, Germany. 258 students of the
Universities of Mannheim and Heidelberg participated in the experiment. Subjects
were randomly assigned to sessions and could take part only once. Except for the
27To keep passive subjects busy we asked them how they would decide if they were agent B.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 43
robustness check, the sessions were framed neutrally28 and lasted about 40 minutes.
Subjects did not receive a show-up fee29 and earned 12.34 e on average.
2.3 Behavioral predictions and hypotheses
2.3.1 Behavioral predictions
How the intensity of incentives a⁄ects B￿ s transfer decision depends on the speci￿c
form of his utility function.
Model 1: The self-interest model
The standard neoclassical approach assumes that all people are sel￿sh, i.e. their
utility function U depends on their own material payo⁄ m only and is increasing in
m. With these assumptions the deterrence hypothesis holds, namely the optimal taken
amount x￿(p;f) is monotonically (weakly) decreasing in p and in f. Due to the ￿xed
￿ne f agent B who maximizes his expected utility either takes as much as possible
(wA) or nothing. This depends on the relative sizes of p, f, wA, wB and on the level of
risk aversion. B￿ s optimal taken amount is
x￿(p;f) 2
8
> > > <
> > > :
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U(wA+wB)￿U(wB￿f)
f0;wAg if p =
U(wA+wB)￿U(wB)
U(wA+wB)￿U(wB￿f)




The higher p and/or the higher f, the less attractive it is to take everything. For
su¢ ciently high values of p and f agent B does not take anything. A higher level of
risk aversion30 reduces
U(wA+wB)￿U(wB)
U(wA+wB)￿U(wB￿f) ceteris paribus, and thus the set of p, f, wA,
wB combinations for which taking everything is optimal.
In our two-agent setup with unequal initial endowments it is likely that agents B
compare their own payo⁄ to that of agent A. Thus, our setup is a context in which it
28Translated instructions for players B can be found in appendix 2.7.1.
29Six subjects did not earn anything in the randomly selected part and in the Holt and Laury
(2002) table.
30Consider the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion ￿
m￿U
00(m)
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is very plausible to consider preferences that re￿ ect concerns for fairness.
Model 2: A model of fairness concerns regarding ￿nal outcomes
Models of fairness concerns regarding ￿nal outcomes (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999,
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) assume that an agent￿ s utility function e U is increasing in
the agent￿ s own material payo⁄ m, but decreasing in payo⁄inequality jm￿yj where y
is the material payo⁄ of the other agent.
In these models, the deterrence hypothesis still holds if there exists a unique optimal
taken amount x￿(p = 0;f = 0) that maximizes agent B￿ s expected utility for p = 0
and f = 0. Due to the ￿xed ￿ne f agent B who maximizes his expected utility either
takes an amount which is optimal for no incentives (x￿(p = 0;f = 0)) or nothing. For
relatively low values of p and f agent B takes x￿(p = 0;f = 0) that may be smaller
than wA. For relatively strong incentives agent B is deterred and takes nothing.
The reason is that agents cannot trade o⁄ payo⁄s from di⁄erent states, in our
context payo⁄s if their transfer is detected and payo⁄s if their transfer is not detected.
Assume there exists a unique optimal transfer amount for p = 0 and f = 0, x￿(p =
0;f = 0). Then, x￿(p ￿ 0;f ￿ 0) cannot be strictly larger than x￿(p = 0;f = 0): If
B￿ s transfer is not detected, utility e U is maximized at x￿(p = 0;f = 0). If B￿ s transfer
is detected, utility e U is the same for any strictly positive transfer amount and largest
for x = 0. Analogously, taking any strictly positive, but strictly smaller amount than
x￿(p = 0;f = 0) yields less expected utility than taking x￿(p = 0;f = 0) and, therefore,
cannot be optimal.
Model 3: A model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes
Models of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes (e.g. Trautmann, 2007)
assume that an agent￿ s utility function b U is increasing in the agent￿ s own material
payo⁄ m and decreasing in the absolute di⁄erence between own expected payo⁄ me
and the other agent￿ s expected payo⁄ ye, jme ￿ yej.
If jme ￿ yej directly enters the utility function, the deterrence hypothesis may not
hold anymore, i.e. x￿(p;f) may be strictly increasing in p and/or f for some values
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The reason is that agents can trade o⁄ payo⁄s from di⁄erent states, e.g. advan-
tageous inequity in material payo⁄s if B￿ s taking is not detected can compensate
disadvantageous inequity in material payo⁄s if B￿ s taking is detected. As an illus-
tration consider the following utility function b U = m ￿ ￿ ￿ maxfme ￿ ye;0g with
me = (1 ￿ p) ￿ (wB + x) + p ￿ (wB ￿ f) and ye = (1 ￿ p) ￿ (wA ￿ x) + p ￿ wA. If
￿ > 1
2, agent B who maximizes expected utility tries to perfectly equate me and ye by
choosing x. Hence, agent B takes more the higher p and/or the higher f. However,
since the transfer amount x is bounded above by wA, agent B is deterred from taking
if p and f are su¢ ciently high.31
Model 4: A model of fairness concerns regarding ￿nal outcomes that are
crowded out by incentives
The literature on crowding out of intrinsic motivation through extrinsic incentives
uses the term "intrinsic motivation" very broadly. It may apply to social preferences
or fairness concerns as well. In our context, crowding out implies that agents￿fair-
ness concerns are decreasing in the intensity of deterrent incentives. Formally, this
assumption can be captured by the following utility function:
V = ￿(p;f) ￿ U(m) + [1 ￿ ￿(p;f)] ￿ e U(m;jm ￿ yj),
where as above U(m) represents utility of a sel￿sh agent and e U(m;jm ￿ yj) utility
of an agent with fairness concerns regarding ￿nal outcomes. The core of the crowding
out assumption is that ￿(p;f) 2 [0;1], the weight of U(m), is (weakly) increasing in p
and in f.
With these assumptions, there may be ranges of p, f combinations such that the
optimal transfer amount x￿(p;f) increases strictly in p and/or f. This is not consistent
with the deterrence hypothesis.
The intuition is that for small values of p and f agent B is relatively fair-minded
and takes only a small amount. If, however, p and f are high, agent B is rather sel￿sh
and takes a larger amount. Only if the levels of p and f are very high such that both
sel￿sh and fair-minded agents are deterred, agent B does not take anything.
31Consider b U and assume that p and f are so high that taking everything would yield me < ye
with me < wB. In this case taking nothing is optimal.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 46
If we should observe crowding out caused by deterrent incentives, our data may be
very useful to contribute evidence to two aspects of crowding on which the verdict is
still out.
(i) Continuity of crowding out
￿(p;f) 2 [0;1] may increase continuously or discontinuously in p and in f. Even if
￿(p;f) increases continuously, the taken amount x￿(p;f) may increase discontinuously
in p and in f for some e U(m;jm ￿ yj).
The empirical results of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) and Gneezy (2003) suggest
discontinuous crowding out. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), however, explain their
data by assuming continuous crowding out.
We have evidence for continuous crowding out if we observe subjects who take less
than the maximal transfer amount wA in a second treatment in which incentives have
been introduced or increased compared to the ￿rst treatment.
(ii) Hysteresis
Extrinsic incentives may crowd out fairness concerns lastingly. As a consequence
the crowding out e⁄ect of an increase in incentives is larger than the crowding in e⁄ect
of the subsequent decrease in incentives that reverses the increase in incentives by size.
Some studies (e.g. Irlenbusch and Sliwka, 2005, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000,
G￿chter, K￿nigstein and Kessler, 2005) ￿nd evidence for hysteresis, i.e. evidence that
incentives crowd out fairness concerns lastingly.
To give an example, if subjects take more in treatment T2 with small incentives if
T2 is played second after treatment T4 with intermediate incentives than if it is played
￿rst we have evidence for hysteresis.
If we ￿nd back￿ring of deterrent incentives plus hysteresis in our data, our results
can only be explained by crowding out of fairness concerns and not by a model of
fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes. Hence, hysteresis might be a mean to
distinguish between the two possible models (model 3 and 4) that can explain back￿ring
incentives.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 47
2.3.2 Hypotheses
The predictions of the various models di⁄er. However, all four models presented above
support hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: Deterrence by strong incentives
Su¢ ciently high values of the detection probability p and the ￿xed ￿ne f deter
agents from taking. This range is larger, the more risk averse an agent is.
The threshold of incentives that e⁄ectively deter may vary by subject. A risk neutral
or risk averse sel￿sh agent will abstain from taking in treatments T5 and T6. A risk
neutral or risk averse agent with standard Fehr-Schmidt (1999) fairness preferences may
even abstain from taking in treatment T4. A subject with fairness concerns regarding
expected outcomes may only abstain from taking if p = 1 and f > 0.
In contrast to hypothesis 1, only the self-interest model and the model of fairness
concerns regarding ￿nal outcomes necessarily imply hypothesis 2, but not the model of
fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes or the model of fairness concerns that
are crowded out by deterrent incentives.
Hypothesis 2: Deterrence hypothesis
The taken amount x is monotonically (weakly) decreasing in the detection proba-
bility p and the ￿xed ￿ne f.
Hypothesis 2 implies that the average taken amount x should be (weakly) decreasing
from treatments T1 to T6.
2.4 Results
First, we will compare the di⁄erent treatments in part 1, i.e. do an across subjects
analysis. This has the advantage that behavior is not in￿ uenced by any preplay. How-
ever, we cannot draw any conclusion whether the observed across subjects phenomena
show up in individual level data and whether hysteresis occurs. Second, we will ad-
dress these issues by comparing behavior in part 1 and 2 with a focus on within subjectAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 48
analysis.
2.4.1 Comparison of treatments in part 1
Summary statistics
Benchmark treatment
The experimental data in treatment T1 show how much people take in the absence
of deterrent incentives. The upper left panel of Figure 2.232 summarizes the distribution
of the taken amount x in the benchmark treatment.
Since treatment T1 is the mirror image of a dictator game, we can compare behavior
in T1 with standard results of dictator games as for example Forsythe et al. (1994).
In line with their paper, we can identify two types of agents: sel￿sh agents and fair-
minded agents. In their benchmark treatment (the paid dictator game conducted in
April with a pie of 5 $) about 45 % of subjects are "pure gamesmen" who do not
give anything, and the rest gives a strictly positive amount. These types of agents
correspond remarkably well to the 47 % (52.5 %) of sel￿sh subjects in treatment T1
who take everything (between 80 and 90), and the rest who takes a strictly positive
amount below 90 (80).
To summarize, we have two types of agents: slightly less than 50 % of our subjects
have standard preferences while a bit more than 50 % have fairness concerns. As
model 2 shows fairness concerns are not necessarily a reason why Becker￿ s deterrence
hypothesis might fail. But it may fail if fairness concerns refer to expected outcomes
or if fairness concerns are crowded out by deterrent incentives. To ￿gure out whether
this is the case we have a closer look at the treatments with deterrent incentives.
Treatments with deterrent incentives
Figure 2.3 summarizes the average taken amount x per treatment.
Treatments are ordered by the intensity of deterrent incentives, i.e. the combined
e⁄ect of detection probability p and ￿ne f (compare Table 2.1). The average taken
32In Figure 2.2 intervals with y < 90 are the union of all points x 2 [y;y + 5) with y denoted at
the horizontal axis. The last interval contains all x = 90.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 49
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amount x increases in the range of no, small and intermediate incentives (from T1
to T4) while it decreases in the range of strong and very strong incentives (T5 and
T6). Hence, the relationship between the average taken amount and the intensity of
deterrent incentives is rather inverted-U shaped than monotonically decreasing.
Figure 2.2 shows that the fraction of subjects taking everything increases by treat-
ment from T1 to T4. In treatment T4, it peaks at a value of more than 80 % which
is considerably higher than the corresponding 47 % in the absence of any incentives in
treatment T1. From treatment T5 onwards this fraction decreases.
The share of subjects not taking anything monotonically increases in the level of
incentives. It is moderate with no, small and intermediate incentives (￿ 10 %), quite
substantial with high incentives (about 25 %) and largest with very strong incentives
(nearly 70 %).
There are always subjects taking interior values of their strategy set, most so in the
benchmark treatment. The share of these subjects decreases in the intensity of incen-
tives. Moreover, the average transfer amount conditional on interior values increases
by treatment from T1 to T4.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 51
Compared to the benchmark treatment deterrent incentives shift mass to the bor-
ders of the support. We observe both back￿ring of small incentives and deterrence at
the same time.33 Small and intermediate incentives move mass predominately towards
the upper border which stands in sharp contrast to the deterrence hypothesis, but is
consistent with a model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes or a model of
fairness concerns that are crowded out by deterrent incentives. Strong and very strong
incentives move mass exactly to the lower border which is consistent with hypothesis
1. Since the results of treatments T2 and T3 are very similar, detection probability
and ￿ne seem to be interchangeable instruments.
Analysis of hypotheses
A Kruskal-Wallis test on behavior in part 1 documents signi￿cant (p < 0.01) treatment
e⁄ects. In order to identify and characterize the signi￿cant di⁄erences we run pair wise
Mann-Whitney tests. The one-sided p-values are recorded in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Pair wise treatment comparisons (Mann-Whitney tests)
T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
T1 0.287 0.234 0.015 0.400 < 0.001
T2 0.408 0.040 0.447 < 0.001
T3 0.058 0.390 < 0.001
T4 0.071 < 0.001
T5 0.005
*: We report one-sided p-values.
In treatment T6, agents take signi￿cantly (p < 0.01) less than in any other treat-
ment. This is consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. However, contradictory to hypothesis
2, the deterrence hypothesis, agents take signi￿cantly more in treatment T4 than in
treatments T1 (p < 0.05), T2 (p < 0.05) and T3 (p = 0.058).34 There is no signi￿cant
di⁄erence in behavior in treatments T2 and T3.
33In an experiment on corruption that uses probabilistic incentives as we do, Schulze and Frank
(2003) observe a similar pattern in their data.
34One-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and ￿2-tests based on a grouping of subjects according to
whether they are deterred, try to roughly equate payo⁄s (take between 15 and 29 units), show some
fairness concerns (take between 30 and 79 units) or are sel￿sh (take between 80 and 90 units) largely
con￿rm the results of the Mann-Whitney tests presented here. In particular, subjects always take
signi￿cantly more in treatment T4 than in T1.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 52
In order to account for individual characteristics when comparing treatments we
estimate two speci￿cations whose marginal e⁄ects are presented in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Regression results (OLS and Tobit)
dependent variable: taken amount x OLS Tobit
explanatory variables
Intercept 57.03 *** 94.54 ***
Sex (1 if male, 0 else) 12.14 * 28.08
Risk aversion (1 if risk averse, 0 else) -14.55 ** -57.16 **
Economist (1 if economist, 0 else) 10.05 * 30.48
DG (donated amount in part 3) -0.12 -0.48
T2 10.23 33.81
T3 9.04 27.32
T4 18.38 ** 87.65 **
T5 -7.38 -20.79
T6 -42.74 *** -132.64 ***
N 129 129
(Pseudo) R2 0.305 0.075
comments: Ti = 1 if treatment = Ti, 0 else
*, **, *** signi￿cant at 10, 5, 1 % level based on robust standard errors
First, we regress the taken amount on individual characteristics and treatment
dummies using OLS estimation. Second, we address the fact that the taken amount is
truncated and estimate a Tobit speci￿cation with the same explanatory variables.
In both estimations the treatment dummy for T4 is signi￿cantly positive (p < 0.05),
the treatment dummy for T6 is signi￿cantly negative (p < 0.05) and the treatment
dummies for T2 and T3 are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each other.35 Hence, our test
results are very robust to including control variables. Risk aversion has a signi￿cantly
negative e⁄ect (p < 0.05) on the taken amount in the both speci￿cations (as subjects
with a high level of risk aversion are more likely to be deterred).
Given our test and estimation results we do not reject hypothesis 1, but we do
reject hypothesis 2, the deterrence hypothesis.
Result 1: Deterrence by strong incentives
Very strong incentives as in treatment T6 signi￿cantly reduce the taken amount.
On average, risk averse agents take signi￿cantly less.
35Adding interaction e⁄ects of the dummy for risk aversion with the treatment dummies in the
OLS estimation does not change any of these results.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 53
Result 2: Back￿ring of small incentives
Deterrent incentives do not monotonically (weakly) decrease the average taken
amount. Intermediate incentives in treatment T4 signi￿cantly increase the average
taken amount.
Result 3: Interchangeability of detection probability and ￿ne
We do not ￿nd any signi￿cant di⁄erences between treatments T2 and T3. In that
sense, detection probability p and ￿ne f seem to be interchangeable policy instruments.
In sum, these results are consistent with the predictions of the model of fairness con-
cerns regarding expected outcomes or the model of fairness concerns that are crowded
out by deterrent incentives.
2.4.2 Comparison of behavior in part 1 and 2
Up to now we have compared di⁄erent treatments across di⁄erent subjects. In contrast
to Becker￿ s deterrence hypothesis our results so far show that intermediate incentives
back￿re. Crowding out of fairness concerns or a model of fairness concerns regarding
expected outcomes are explanations for this phenomenon. Since each subject sequen-
tially participated in two di⁄erent treatments, we can further analyze how the same
individuals react to a change of deterrent incentives.36 Sessions in which we increase
incentives allow to analyze (i) whether back￿ring of small and intermediate incentives
is observed on an individual level, and (ii) whether back￿ring is a continuous or discon-
tinuous process. Sessions in which we decrease incentives enable us to check whether
we observe hysteresis. Sessions with incentives of constant intensity indicate whether
p and f are interchangeable instruments at an individual level.
Back￿ring of incentives at an individual level
In three di⁄erent sessions, we increase the intensity of incentives from part 1 to part
2: in session T1T3 from no to small incentives, in session T2T4 from small to inter-
36Since subjects do not get any feedback after part 1, behavioral e⁄ects cannot be triggered by the
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mediate incentives, in session T5T6 from strong to very strong incentives. Figure 2.4
summarizes how subjects behave in part 2 conditional on whether they acted sel￿shly
(x = 90), acted fair-mindedly (0 < x < 90) or were deterred (x = 0) in part 1.
Since the benchmark treatment was played in the ￿rst part of session T1T3, we
can identify about 47 % of subjects with standard preferences. All except one take
everything in part 2 again. 53 % of all subjects take an amount strictly less than
everything in part 1. About a third of them increase the taken amount x to a level
smaller than 90, a ￿fth is switches to taking everything in part 2 and another ￿fth
keeps x constant. Hence, for 50 % of fair subjects small incentives seem to strictly
back￿re. Only one sel￿sh and one fair-minded subject are deterred by small incentives.
In session T2T4, about 63 % of subjects take everything already in part 1. We can-
not distinguish whether they have standard preferences or whether they have fairness
concerns that are crowded out by the small incentives in part 1. Again, the majority
of these subjects is not deterred and keeps taking everything in part 2. The share of
subjects taking intermediate amounts in part 1 is considerably smaller than in session
T1T3. For 20 % of these subjects the increase of incentives completely back￿res. The
majority, however, is deterred. Note that a moderate fraction of deterrence can already
be found in part 1.37
In session T5T6, 62.5 % of subjects still take everything in part 1. More than two
thirds of them are deterred by the increase of incentives though. 25 % of all subjects
are deterred in part 1 and stay deterred in part 2. Only 12.5 % of subjects take a
strictly positive amount below 90 in part 1. Half of them are deterred in the second
part.
These observations can be summarized in the following two results:
Result 4: Back￿ring of incentives on an individual level
Subjects seem to be heterogeneous. There are sel￿sh agents for whom the deterrence
hypothesis holds. However, there are also fair-minded agents for whom small and
37In sessions T1T3 and T2T4 none of the proposed models can explain the behavior of subjects
who react to increased incentives by decreasing the taken amount to a level larger than 0 or increasing
it from 0 to a strictly positive amount.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 55
Figure 2.4: Reactions to an increase in the intensity of incentivesAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 56
intermediate incentives back￿re. Independent of the type of agent strong incentives
deter.
Result 5: Continuous and discontinuous back￿ring of incentives
We ￿nd evidence for both continuous and discontinuous back￿ring of incentives.
Hysteresis
Whether hysteresis (lasting crowding out) is present in our data can be seen by compar-
ing behavior of a given treatment played in part 1 with behavior of the same treatment
played in part 2 after a part 1 treatment with stronger incentives. Hysteresis im-
plies that we should observe order e⁄ects for treatments T1, T2 and T5 because they
are played second in sessions in which we decrease deterrent incentives (T3T1, T4T2,
T6T5). Table 2.5 records two-sided p-values of pair wise Mann-Whitney tests that
compare the same treatment played in di⁄erent parts of a session.38
Table 2.5: Order e⁄ects (Mann-Whitney tests)
Treatment played played p-value
￿rst in second in (two sided)
T1 T1T3 T3T1 0.082
T2 T2T3 T3T2 0.099
T2T4 T4T2
T3 T3T1 T1T3 0.676
T3T2 T2T3
T4 T4T2 T2T4 0.061
T5 T5T6 T6T5 0.014
T6 T6T5 T5T6 0.617
As Table 2.5 indicates we indeed observe order e⁄ects in treatments T1, T2 and T5.
Subjects in T1 take signi￿cantly (p < 0.05) more when it is played after T3 (81.3 instead
of 65.0 units on average). Preplay in T3 with small incentives increases the average
taken amount in treatment T1 that does not implement any incentives. Similarly,
the average taken amount in T2 is signi￿cantly (p < 0.05) higher when it is played
38Treatments T2 and T3 are played second in two di⁄erent sessions. Since the observations from
the di⁄erent second parts are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent (p=0.71 and p=0.34, respectively according
to two-sided Mann-Whitney tests) for di⁄erent sessions, we do not report each session comparison
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second (after a harsher or a constant intensity of incentives) than ￿rst. Both results
are consistent with a model of lasting crowding out but cannot be reconciled with the
predictions of a model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes. In contrast,
in T5 with strong deterrent incentives subjects take signi￿cantly (p < 0.05) less when
it is played after T6. Preplay in T6 with very strong incentives seems to increase
deterrence in treatment T5. This is inconsistent with both a model of lasting crowding
out and a model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes (if fairness concerns
imply that fair subjects take weakly less in T5 than sel￿sh subjects for a given level
of risk aversion). However, we do not expect that preplay in T6 signi￿cantly increases
the taken amount x in treatment T5 as risk neutral or risk averse sel￿sh agents are
deterred anyway.
Result 6: Hysteresis
Small and intermediate incentives have a lasting e⁄ect. They still back￿re when
incentives are decreased or even removed in the following period.
Since we observe hysteresis, a model of crowding out of fairness concerns explains
our data better than a model of fairness concerns regarding expected outcomes. Hys-
teresis also underlines how costly extrinsic incentives are. In addition to the e⁄ect
incentives have in the current period they may also in￿ uence behavior in future peri-
ods. Also strong incentives could potentially back￿re by crowding out fairness concerns
in future periods in which incentives are smaller.
In treatments with an increase in incentives there are no signi￿cant order e⁄ects
for treatments T3 and T6, but subjects in treatment T4 take signi￿cantly (p < 0.05)
less when it is played in part 2 after treatment T2 than when treatment T4 is played
in part 1.
Substitutability of detection probability and ￿ne
Since treatments T2 and T3 have the same intensity of deterrent incentives imple-
mented by di⁄erent levels of detection probability p and ￿ne f we can test - at least for
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have already seen that the treatments T2 and T3 do not di⁄er signi￿cantly in across
subjects data when they are played in part 1 (result 3). Our within subject data in
Figures 2.5 con￿rm this result.
In session T3T2 only a single subject is apart from the 45￿ line. 6 subjects keep
taking everything, 2 keep taking the same intermediate amount. In session T2T3 7 out
of 10 subjects do not change their behavior.
Result 7: Interchangeability of detection probability and ￿ne at an indi-
vidual level
Within subject data con￿rm result 3 that p and f seem to be interchangeable
instruments.
2.5 Robustness check - Framing
So far we have presented results from neutrally framed experiments. This is a valid
approach to testing Becker￿ s (1986) deterrence hypothesis that relies on pure incentive
e⁄ects. While a non-neutral frame may ceteris paribus a⁄ect the taken amount (e.g.
due to additional moral costs) comparative statics should remain unchanged. For
any given (neutral or non-neutral) frame the deterrence hypothesis predicts the taken
amount to be monotonically decreasing in detection probability and ￿ne. In contrast,
it is not clear whether a non-neutral frame interacts with incentives in the model of
fairness concerns that are crowded out by incentives which ￿ts our data best. While
neutrally framed incentives crowd out fairness concerns, this may not necessarily be
the case for incentives that are combined with a strong moral connotation.
In real life deterrent incentives often have a moral connotation and policy makers
may try to make use of that. This is why we run two additional morally framed sessions
and have a look at whether a non-neutral, moral frame will change our results. In the
morally framed sessions the "transfer decision" was labeled as "stealing" if x > 0 and
the ￿xed ￿ne f was called "penalty" instead of "minus points". Apart from these
two di⁄erent labels the neutrally and morally framed sessions were conducted in a
completely identical manner. In order to check whether framing a⁄ects behavior inAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 59
Figure 2.5: Reactions to a change in incentives keeping their intensity constantAn experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 60
the absence of incentives we run a framed version of treatment T1 (T1f). To analyze
whether framing and incentives interact we run a framed version of treatment T4
(T4f).39 38 subjects participated in session T1fT4f, 32 subjects in session T4fT1f.
The results in the framed and neutral treatments are similar. There is no signi￿cant
framing e⁄ect in part 1 in the absence of incentives, i.e. in T1 and T1f (two-sided
Mann-Whitney test: p > 0.5). In contrast, subjects take more in treatment T4 than
in treatment T4f in part 1 (two-sided Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.075). However, the
within subject results document a substantial degree of crowding out: when incentives
are introduced in part 2 of session T1fT4f more than 30 % of individuals ￿ ip from
intermediate amounts to taking everything. This parallels the results obtained in the
neutrally framed sessions T1T3 and T2T4. In sum, we conclude that also with moral
framing back￿ring of intermediate incentives is a non-negligible phenomenon.
2.6 Conclusion
We have presented an experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis applied to the
context of stealing. Our across subjects data reject the hypothesis that the average
taken amount is monotonically decreasing in deterrent incentives. On average, subjects
take most when intermediate incentives are present. Only very strong incentives deter.
Both our across subjects comparison of behavior in part 1 and our within subject
comparison of behavior in part 1 and 2 re￿ ect two di⁄erent types of subjects. We iden-
tify 50 % sel￿sh subjects whose behavior is consistent with the deterrence hypothesis
and 50 % fair-minded subjects for whom intermediate incentives back￿re. Since we
observe hysteresis, a model of lasting crowding out of fairness concerns explains our
data best.
We have contributed to the empirical literature on crowding out in various ways.
First, we have established the existence of crowding out as a reaction to probabilistic
39We choose treatment T4 since the intensity of deterrent incentives in this treatment is (i) low
enough not to deter the majority of individuals and (ii) high enough to potentially crowd out fairness
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incentives40 and in a new domain, namely when incentives are set to deter criminal ac-
tivities. Second, our within subject results provide further evidence for lasting crowding
out as it is observed by Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000),
and G￿chter, K￿nigstein and Kessler (2005). While lasting crowding out exists for
many subjects, we have also observed some subjects whose fairness concerns are - at
least partially - reestablished when incentives are reduced or removed completely. The
circumstances under which crowding out is lasting remain a topic for future research.
Third, our study has explicitly focused on the domain of small incentives that are
especially important in real life41: we have run four out of six treatments with small
incentives that according to standard neoclassical theory should not have any e⁄ect
on a risk neutral subject￿ s behavior. Thus, we have many observations to closely ana-
lyze whether crowding out is a continuous or discontinuous process. For example, the
empirical results of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) and Gneezy (2003) suggest discon-
tinuous crowding out. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), however, explain their data by
assuming continuous crowding. Our within subject analysis ￿nds evidence for both.
Furthermore, we observe crowding out of fairness concerns in a very simple setting
which does not leave a lot of scope for the triggers of crowding out that are stressed
in the theoretical literature. First, since incentives are set exogenously by the exper-
imenter and are not endogenously determined by another subject, incentives cannot
cause crowding out by signaling beliefs on other players￿types (e.g. lack of trustworthi-
ness) as in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2005) or by signaling norms as in Sliwka (2007).
Second, an action￿ s costs and bene￿ts are common knowledge in our experiment. Thus,
high incentives, for example, cannot cause crowding out by signaling high costs or low
bene￿ts of an action as in BØnabou and Tirole (2003). Last, in BØnabou and Tirole
(2007) the presence of extrinsic incentives removes the possibility for agents to signal
their own type (to other agents or to themselves). In our experiment, the initial en-
40To our knowledge the only other paper that documents crowding out of intrinsic motivation due
to probabilistic incentives is Schulze and Frank (2003).
41In Germany, the clearance rate for thefts with (without) aggravating circumstances was 14 %
(44 %) in 2005 (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, 2005, Table 23). Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998)
present ￿gures for tax evasion in the US: in 1995, the audit rate for individual tax return was only 1.7
%, the penalty for underpayment of taxes usually 20 % of the underpayment. Polinsky and Shavell
(2000b) point out that in general the severity of punishment is quite low in relation to what potential
o⁄enders are capable to pay.An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 62
dowment of passive agents A is larger than the one of agents B such that agents B
can signal their intrinsic motivation to behave fairly even if deterrent incentives are
present. Kahneman and Tversky￿ s (1986) argument that extrinsic incentives shift the
context from an ethical and other-regarding to an instrumental and self-regarding one
seems to be more adequate for our data. Similarly, our ￿ndings con￿rm those of Houser
et al. (2007) who show that crowding out of intrinsic motivation is not only caused by
the intentions that incentives signal but also by incentives per se.
What are the policy implications from our experimental study? Taking our data
literally would imply to punish criminal behavior either hard or not at all to avoid
back￿ring of small incentives. Of course, the laboratory may abstract from social
norms and stigmata that could be the driving forces behind punishment in reducing
criminal behavior. Thus, we do not conclude that punishment does not work outside
the laboratory. However, our data directly reject the deterrence hypothesis that relies
on punishment whose e⁄ectiveness is caused by pure incentive e⁄ects. Our results
show that if crime were a gamble - as economists generally argue and as we have
modeled it in the laboratory - pure incentives may not work: Especially small and
intermediate incentives back￿re and may crowd out fairness concerns lastingly. Thus,
to convincingly contribute to the discussion on how to e¢ ciently deter crime economists
should go beyond the standard deterrence hypothesis.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Experimental sessions and instructions
The order of events during each experimental session was the following: Subjects were
welcomed and randomly assigned a cubicle in the laboratory where they took their
decisions in complete anonymity from the other participants. The random allocation
to a cubicle also determined a subject￿ s role in all three parts. Subjects were handed
out the general instructions for the experiment as well as the instructions for part
1. After all subjects had read both instructions carefully and all remaining questions
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were conducted in an analogous way. We ￿nished each experimental session by letting
subjects answer a questionnaire that asked for demographic characteristics and included
a Holt and Laury (2002) table. This table was explained in detail in the questionnaire
and it was highlighted that one randomly drawn decision from the table was paid out
in addition to the earnings in the previous parts.
Instructions, the program and the questionnaire were originally written in German.
The translated general instructions, the translated instructions of the neutrally framed
treatment T4 in part 1 for agent B and the translated Holt and Laury (2002) table can
be found in the following section. Instructions for part 2 and part 3 are as similar to
part 1 as possible. For the framed treatments we used the expression "steal any integer
amount between 0 and 90 from participant A" instead of "choose any integer amount
between 0 and 90 that shall be transferred from participant A to you" and the term
"minus a penalty of x points" instead of "minus an amount of x points".
Translated general instructions
General explanations concerning the experiment
Welcome to this experiment. You and the other participants are asked to make deci-
sions. Your decisions as well as the decisions of the other participants will determine
the result of the experiment. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash
according to the actual result. So please read the instructions thoroughly and think
about your decision carefully.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to the other participants, to use cell
phones or to start any other programs on the computer. The neglect of these rules will
lead to the immediate exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If you have
any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to your seat to
answer your questions.
During the experiment we will talk about points instead of Euros. Your total income
will therefore be calculated in points ￿rst. At the end of the experiment the total
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rate:
1 point = 15 Cents.
The experiment consists of three independent parts in which you can accumulate
points. Before each part only the instructions of this part will be handed out.
During the experiment neither you nor the other participants will receive
any information on the course of the experiment (e.g. decisions of other
participants or results of a particular part).
The results of each single part will be calculated only after all three parts will be
￿nished. Then, one of these three parts will be chosen randomly. At the end
of the whole experiment only this part will be paid out in cash according
to your decisions.
Translated instructions of the neutrally framed treatment T4 in part 1
Part 1
In this part there are participants in role A and participants in role B. You
have been randomly assigned role B for this part. You will be randomly and
anonymously matched to another participant in role A. This random matching
lasts only for this part. The matched participant will not be matched to you in the
following two parts again. Neither before nor after the experiment will you receive any
information about the identity of your matched participant. Likewise, your matched
participant will not receive any information about your identity.
As participant B you have an initial endowment of 50 points. Participant A has an
initial endowment of 90 points.
As a participant in role B you can choose any integer amount between 0 and 90
points (including 0 and 90) which shall be transferred from participant A to
you. Participant A does not make any decision. In order to make your decision please
enter your chosen amount on the corresponding computer screen and push the OK
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￿ If you choose a transfer amount of 0 points, you will receive your initial endow-
ment of 50 points, and participant A will receive his initial endowment of 90
points.
￿ If you choose a transfer amount larger than 0 points,
￿with 40 % probability you will receive your initial endowment
of 50 points plus your chosen transfer amount and participant A
will receive his initial endowment of 90 points minus your chosen
transfer amount.
￿with 60 % probability you will receive your initial endowment
of 50 points minus an amount of 20 points, i.e. 30 points, and
participant A will receive his initial endowment of 90 points.
Example 1: You choose a transfer amount of 22 points. With 40 % probability you
will receive 50 + 22 points = 72 points, and with 60 % probability you will receive 50
￿20 points = 30 points. Participant A will receive 90 ￿22 points = 68 points with 40
% probability and his initial endowment of 90 points with 60 % probability.
Example 2: You choose a transfer amount of 0 points. You will receive 50 points.
Participant A will receive 90 points.
The course of action of part 1 is illustrated by the following graph:An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis 66
Your decision
You choose a transfer amount
of 0 points.
You choose a transfer amount
larger than 0 points.
Your points: 50
Participant A’ s points: 90
Einkommen von Akteur 2:
10
Punkte
With 40 % probability:
Your points: 50 + chosen transfer amount
Participant A’ s points: 90 –chosen transfer amount
With 60 % probability:
Your points: 50-20=30
Participant A’ s points: 90
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to your
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2.7.2 Translated Holt and Laury (2002) table
Decision Option A Option B
Decision 1 10 points 25 points with a probability of 10 %
0 points with a probability of 90 %
Decision 2 10 points 25 points with a probability of 20 %
0 points with a probability of 80 %
Decision 3 10 points 25 points with a probability of 30 %
0 points with a probability of 70 %
Decision 4 10 points 25 points with a probability of 40 %
0 points with a probability of 60 %
Decision 5 10 points 25 points with a probability of 50 %
0 points with a probability of 50 %
Decision 6 10 points 25 points with a probability of 60 %
0 points with a probability of 40 %
Decision 7 10 points 25 points with a probability of 70 %
0 points with a probability of 30 %
Decision 8 10 points 25 points with a probability of 80 %
0 points with a probability of 20 %
Decision 9 10 points 25 points with a probability of 90 %
0 points with a probability of 10 %
Decision 10 10 points 25 points with a probability of 100 %
0 points with a probability of 0 %
Participants made ten separate decisions whether they preferred option A to option
B with the varying associated probabilities displayed above. One decision was chosen
randomly (all with equal probability) and paid at the end of the experiment.
We classify the 51 subjects who prefer option A to option B in decisions 1 till 4
and option B to option A otherwise as risk neutral. The 16 subjects switching before
decision number 5 are categorized as risk seeking. We have 88 risk averse subjects who
switch from preferring option A to option B only at a decision number higher than 5.
Three subjects behave irrationally (or are humble): they always prefer option A.Chapter 3
Does parental employment a⁄ect
children￿ s educational attainment?
Evidence from Germany
3.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, female labor market participation rates and especially those of
mothers with young children have increased tremendously in many countries. In the
US, 47 % of mothers with children below age 6 worked in 1975. By 2006, this share
had increased to 71 % (Chao and Rones, 2007, Table 7). In Germany, 35 % of mothers
with children below age 6 worked in 1974, but 52 % in 2004. In contrast, labor market
participation rates of German fathers have remained very stable at about 88 %.42
Precise knowledge about how parental employment a⁄ects children￿ s long-term out-
comes such as educational attainments or labor market success is crucial for the evalu-
ation of many policy programs. For example, US welfare reforms in the 1990s pushed
welfare recipients and in particular welfare dependent single mothers to ￿nd employ-
ment (compare Blank, 2002). Reforms were motivated by the belief that parental work
is the best way out of poverty for parents and children. If, however, having working
42Figures stem from an inquiry at the Federal Statistical O¢ ce of Germany. The 35 % in 1974
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parents hurts the educational and labor market prospects of children such reforms may
be counterproductive in the long run. To give another example, the current German
government￿ s decision to substantially expand and subsidize day care facilities for chil-
dren below age 3 has lead to emotional and controversial debates in the German public.
Opponents of day care expansion consider full-time parental child care to be decisive
for children￿ s cognitive and emotional development. Proponents argue that parent-
child interactions can be substituted by high quality non-parental child care and that
increases in family income may also bene￿t children.
This paper is the ￿rst to use a large German household panel data set, the Ger-
man Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), to analyze whether parental employment hurts
or bene￿ts children￿ s educational attainments. Our measure of educational attainment
and dependent variable is attendance or completion of high secondary school track (so
called Gymnasium) which is the only track that provides direct access to university.
We separately analyze two e⁄ects of parental employment: ￿rst, the e⁄ect on income
that may in￿ uence child-related investments, i.e. we control for total household in-
come. Second, we use three di⁄erent measures of parental time inputs in raising their
children to capture the "time e⁄ect" of parental employment: weekly hours worked,
the number of years in which parents work full-time, part-time or not at all and weekly
hours that parents spent on child care when children are aged 0-3.
We explicitly approach potential endogeneity problems. First, to take selection of
parents in the labor market into account we estimate a model on sibling di⁄erences that
controls for all unobserved time-invariant parent and household characteristics. Second,
we address the potential reverse causality problem, i.e. the fact that parents￿decisions
to work may be in￿ uenced by their child￿ s ability which in turn a⁄ects educational
attainment. We focus on parental employment when children are aged 0-3 such that a
child￿ s ability is not yet fully revealed, exclude disabled children from the analysis and
use parents￿years of education as a proxy for their child￿ s ability.
We do not ￿nd any evidence that parental employment hurts children￿ s educational
attainment. Controlling for household income we can statistically rule out that having
a mother who works one hour more per week lowers the probability of high secondaryParental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 70
track attendance by more than 0.1 percentage points. Actually, all coe¢ cients of
maternal employment are positive, but not signi￿cant at conventional levels (though
at a 9 to 11 % signi￿cance level). Coe¢ cients of fathers￿employment and parental time
spent on child care are precisely estimated, but too small to be signi￿cant. Testing for
equality of mother￿ s and father￿ s time input coe¢ cients, we cannot reject that parents￿
time inputs are substitutes.
Table 3.1 reviews results from previous economic studies that investigate the re-
lationship between parental employment and children￿ s educational attainment. In
sum, evidence is very inconclusive: some studies predict a negative e⁄ect of parental
employment on children￿ s educational attainment, some a positive one and the remain-
der insigni￿cant e⁄ects or e⁄ects that di⁄er by subsamples such as sex or race of the
child. Table 3.1 also reveals some characterizing features of existing studies. First
and most importantly, except for Ermisch and Francesconi (2002) the studies listed in
Table 3.1 ignore problems that arise due to omitted variables such as a child￿ s ability
or selection of parents into the labor market. In contrast, this paper addresses the con-
ditions under which we obtain consistent estimates explicitly and estimates a model on
sibling di⁄erences to control for unobserved parent and household characteristics. Sec-
ond, only two studies (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2002 and O￿ Brien and Jones, 1999)
report estimates on the e⁄ect of father￿ s employment. Our paper estimates the ef-
fects of parental employment separately for mothers and fathers and as Ermisch and
Francesconi (2002) also the joint e⁄ect of e.g. hours worked. Third, all studies use
US or British data. Since the institutional environment (child care facilities, mater-
nity leave policies, etc.) and the attitudes towards working mothers di⁄er substantially
across countries, evidence from Anglo-Saxon countries might not be transferable to
other Western countries. Our study adds evidence from Germany to the existing liter-
ature. Last, all studies in Table 3.1 use indirect measures of parental time inputs such
as the type of parental employment (full-time, part-time or none) or years worked.43
An advantage of the GSOEP data set is that it contains very detailed information on
43Haveman, Wolfe and Spaulding (1991) use estimated parental time spent on child care as ex-
planatory variable. They do not have information on time spent on child care in their original data
but construct it from a second data set. Using the second data set they regress child care time on
explanatory variables that their original data and the second data set have in common and then apply
coe¢ cients to their original data set to construct estimates of child care time.Parental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 71
Table 3.1: Related literature
study data source, outcome estimation e⁄ect of parental
country method employment*
Ermisch and British highest logit, linear mother works part-time:
Francesconi Household educational probability level estimates: (-) ns
(2002) Panel Survey, quali￿cation models, sibling di⁄erence est.: (-) 10
UK (A level or sibling mother works full-time:
more) di⁄erences level estimates: (-) ns
model sibling di⁄erence est.: (-) 5
father works:
level estimates: (+) 5
sibling di⁄erence est.: (-) ns
Graham, Beller Current years of 2SLS, ￿rst mother worked outside
and Hernandez Population schooling at stage: IV for home: (+) 1
(1994) Survey, US ages 16-20 child support
Haveman, Wolfe Panel Study high school probit model years mother worked: (+) 1
and Spaulding of Income graduation
(1991) Dynamics, US
Hill and Duncan Panel Study of years of OLS, mother￿ s work hours:
(1987) Income schooling at gender for men: (-) 5
Dynamics, US ages 27-29 speci￿c for women: (-) ns
Kiernan (1996) National Child no degree descriptive mother￿ s non-employment:
Development statistics, for men: no e⁄ect
Study, UK logit model for women: (+) 1
Krein and Beller National years of OLS, gender mother ever worked outside
(1988) Longitudinal schooling and race home at least 6 months at
Surveys, US at age 26 speci￿c ages 0-18:
white men: (-) 1
white women: (-) ns
black men: (+) ns
black women: (-) ns
O￿ Brien and survey and highest / logit model low educational outcome:
Jones (1999) time-use diaries lowest father works full time and
in 6 schools in national mother full time: (-) ns
East London, test mother part-time: (-) 5
UK scores high educational outcome:
father works full-time and
mother full time: (+) ns
mother part-time: (+) 10
* (-) indicates a negative sign, (+) a positive sign
ns: not signi￿cant; 1, 5, 10: signi￿cant at a 1, 5, 10 percent signi￿cance levelParental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 72
the time parents spent on child care. Besides the commonly used indirect measures we
use the hours parents spent on child care on a typical weekday when children are aged
0-3 as a direct measure of parental time inputs in raising their children.
Haveman and Wolfe (1995) review studies on the e⁄ects of parental employment on
a broad range of children￿ s outcomes such as high school graduation, years of schooling,
out-of-wedlock fertility or adult earnings. All reviewed studies use US data and do not
address endogeneity problems. Ermisch and Francesconi (2005) survey the more recent
literature on parental employment and children￿ s well-being covering studies that use
data from countries di⁄erent from the US, mainly from UK.
Using German administrative data Dustmann and Sch￿nberg (2007) analyze the
e⁄ect of three extensions in maternity leave coverage on children￿ s later attendance of
high secondary track and wages. They compare cohorts of children born shortly before
and after the reforms. Although reforms induced women to delay their return to work,
the authors do not ￿nd that an expansion in maternity leave legislation improves child
outcomes. By exploiting unexpected changes in legislation the authors can nicely
infer causal e⁄ects at the cohort level. We consider our approach complementary to
theirs: using individual level instead of cohort data we can evaluate the importance of
numerous individual and family characteristics for child outcomes.
A couple of papers use GSOEP data to explain high secondary track attendance, but
none analyzes the impact of parental employment. B￿chel and Duncan (1998) explore
the role of parents￿social activities (e.g. socializing with friends, attending cultural
events, doing volunteer work), Francesconi, Jenkins and Siedler (2006) the impact of
growing up in a family headed by a single mother and Tamm (2007) investigates the
e⁄ect of parental income on high secondary track attendance.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 o⁄ers basic information on the
German school system, section 3 provides a brief overview on the GSOEP data set.
Economic framework and estimation methods are discussed in section 4. In section 5,
we present results from level and sibling di⁄erence regressions as well as non-parametric
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3.2 Institutional background: the German school
system
In Germany, all students jointly go to elementary school for at least four years. After
elementary school, usually at age 10, students proceed to secondary education. The
secondary education system is organized in three main tracks: Least academic and
most vocational general secondary school track (Hauptschule, grades 5 to 9) provides
basic secondary education and prepares for an apprenticeship in a blue collar job. In-
termediate secondary school track (Realschule, grades 5 to 10 or 11) is usually followed
by an apprenticeship in a white collar job. Only students of the most academic track,
the high secondary school track (Gymnasium, grades 5 to 12 or 13), obtain a ￿nal
degree that provides access to university.
Education is regulated by the states (Bundesl￿nder). In all states, track choice after
elementary school is in￿ uenced by a recommendation of elementary school teachers that
is mainly based on performance and the decision of parents. To which extent parents
can in￿ uence their child￿ s school track di⁄ers substantially across states. In some states
the tracking decision is delayed from fourth to sixth grade, and all students jointly go to
F￿rderschule in ￿fth and sixth grade. Furthermore, some states have a comprehensive
school type (Gesamtschule) that comprises all three tracks. All states have schools
for children with special needs due to physical or mental disabilities (Sonderschule).
Finally, there are very few so-called Waldorf schools that are private and follow a special
pedagogy. Still, in our data, about 88 % of students are part of the standard three
track system: 20 % attend general secondary school track, 34 % intermediate and high
secondary school track each. In all states, secondary education is compulsory up to
grade 9 and provided free of charge.
Changing secondary school track after initial choice is possible, but relatively rare.
Using GSOEP data on West Germans born between 1970 and 1984, Tamm (2007)
compares secondary school tracks attended at age 14 with the highest secondary school
degree obtained at age 21. He ￿nds that between 60 % and 70 % of students obtain the
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mobility: 21 % (5 %) of those attending intermediate (general) secondary school at
age 14 manage to obtain a degree which provides complete or restricted access to
university. In each school track roughly 10 % drop out without any degree. Schnepf
(2002) provides further evidence on low rates of track changing.
The dependent variable of our analysis is secondary school track, more precisely
whether a child attends high secondary track or does not. Secondary school track
is an important determinant of labor market outcomes later in life. Using GSOEP
data, Dustmann (2004) shows that having successfully attended the high (intermediate)
instead of the general secondary school track increases the wage at labor market entry
by 29.3 % for men and 37.7 % for women (15.9 % for men and 26.7 % for women,
respectively). This holds true even when controlling for post-secondary education that
is strongly in￿ uenced by secondary school track. The wage premium increases to far
more than 50 % for a high instead of general secondary education degree when post-
secondary education is not controlled for.
3.3 Data
We use data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a rep-
resentative panel study of German households that covers the years 1984 until 2006.
In addition to household level information, individual information is available. Data
cover a wide range of topics such as individual attitudes and health status, job charac-
teristics, unemployment and income, family characteristics and living conditions. For
children up to age 15, personal information is provided by the head of the household.
We use subsamples A to D, i.e. data on households living in East and West Germany44
irrespective of their nationality. Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2003) provide a detailed
description of the GSOEP.
Our dependent variable is binary and indicates whether a child attends high sec-
ondary school track or does not, i.e. attends general or intermediate secondary ed-
ucation. Hence, it focuses on whether children will obtain access to university after
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￿nishing school or do an apprenticeship as both general and intermediate secondary
track students usually do.45 We use the latest available information on track choice to
minimize inaccurateness caused by later changing of tracks. Children attending other
types of schools (such as Gesamtschule, F￿rderschule, Waldorfschule or Sonderschule)
are excluded from our analysis.
Parents￿time inputs are the primary variables of interest. We use three alternative
variables to check the sensitivity of our results: (i) weekly hours worked, (ii) the number
of years in which parents have a full-time, part-time or no job, and (iii) hours spent on
child care on an average weekday. While average hours spent on child care is the most
direct measure, it is also the most subjective one. Some parents claim to devote 24
hours per day to child care, others, who also stay at home, state much lower numbers.
In contrast, type of employment and hours worked are more objective measures. They
do not capture time inputs directly, but are strongly negatively correlated with hours
spent on child care: for fathers, the correlation coe¢ cient ￿ between hours worked and
time spent on child care is ￿0:34 and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero (p < 0:001),
for mothers, ￿ = ￿0:32 with p < 0:001.46 For the largest part of our analysis we
use averages of one of these three variables over a child￿ s ￿rst three years. There are
two reasons for focusing on the ￿rst three years. First, this is the period that is most
debated in public - for example, up to now public child care facilities in (West) Germany
have nearly exclusively been available for children from age three onwards. Second, as
will become clear in the next paragraph, our identifying assumption is that parents
do not know their child￿ s ability as long as their child is su¢ ciently small and, thus,
cannot condition their employment decision on their child￿ s ability. This assumption
is more plausible the younger a child is.
A list of all explanatory variables, their means and sample sizes is displayed in Ta-
45Reducing the three track system to a binary dependent variable makes our results better compa-
rable to those of the related literature, see for example Puhani and Weber (2007), B￿chel and Duncan
(1998) and Francesconi, Jenskin and Siedler (2006). Furthermore, results of a model with a binary
dependent variable are easier to interpret than those of an ordered logit model. While it would in
principle be possible to estimate an ordered logit model on sibling di⁄erences, this would require the
additional assumption that the di⁄erence between general and intermediate secondary track is the
same as the di⁄erence between intermediate and high secondary track.
46Similarly, the correlation coe¢ cients between working full-time and average hours spent on child
care per day are ￿ = ￿0:32 for fathers and ￿ = ￿0:28 for mothers, both with p < 0:001.Parental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 76
ble 3.2. As robustness checks, Tables 3.8 and 3.9 in the appendix present the complete
results of our main speci￿cation when using data on non-foreign West Germans (sub-
sample A) only (Table 8, column (2)), when using school track information at age 14
(instead of latest available information) as dependent variable (Table 8, column (3)) or
when using parents￿year-speci￿c time use and employment information (Table 9). For
all robustness checks, magnitudes of coe¢ cients and signi￿cance levels do not change
substantially compared to the baseline speci￿cation.Parental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 77
Table 3.2: Summary statistics
variable general sample siblings sample
information on the child
attends high secondary school track 0.356 0.329
male 0.500 0.507
year of birth 1989.614 1989.835
￿rstborn child 0.484 0.402
born from January till June 0.508 0.513
information on the household
total monthly net equivalent income*,** 0.917 0.924
non-German household 0.238 0.238
information on the mother
age at birth <=21 0.117 0.127
age at birth 22-35 0.829 0.838
age at birth >36 0.053 0.035
years of education 11.486 11.549
weekly hours worked* 7.743 5.196
time spent on child care per weekday* 8.839 9.454
not working (number of years) 2.189 2.338
part-time job (number of years) 0.477 0.451
full-time job (number of years) 0.334 0.211
information on the father
age at birth <=21 0.028 0.025
age at birth 22-35 0.829 0.864
age at birth >36 0.143 0.111
years of education 11.949 11.993
weekly hours worked* 40.363 40.182
time spent on child care per weekday* 2.235 2.288
not working (number of years) 0.196 0.198
part-time job (number of years) 0.028 0.048
full-time job (number of years) 2.775 2.754
N*** 1047 550
* average at ages 0-3 of child
** in 1000 Euros
*** deviant number of observations for time spent on child care (N=1032 and 537)
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3.4 Economic framework, identi￿cation and esti-
mation
Why should parental employment a⁄ect children￿ s educational attainments? The very
stylized and simpli￿ed static framework underlying our empirical analysis assumes that
children￿ s educational attainment si is a function of parents￿time inputs, ti, and goods
and services inputs, xi, and the child￿ s ability, ￿i: si = f(ti;xi;￿i) where all three ￿rst
partial derivatives are positive. Both time and good inputs are in￿ uenced by parents￿
employment decisions. On the one hand, we expect parents who work to spend less
time with their children (e.g. to play with them or to educate them) which results
in a negative "time e⁄ect". On the other hand, we expect a positive "input e⁄ect".
The more parents work the higher is the family income. Due to the income e⁄ect
normal good inputs such as the number of books and toys at home or extra lessons
in the afternoon will increase (if parents are altruistic at least to some degree). In
our regressions, we will use family income as (the best available) proxy for goods and
services inputs.
Our framework is most closely related to Leibowitz (1974) who assumes that family
income has an additional direct impact on the schooling level. A similar relationship can
also be derived from a production function framework that draws an analogy between
the knowledge acquisition process of an individual and the production process in a ￿rm
(see, for example, Todd and Wolpin, 2003). The theory of family behavior (see Becker
and Tomes, 1986, 1979 and Solon, 1999 for a simpli￿ed version) assumes that parents￿
intertemporal utility depends on their own consumption and on children￿ s outcomes
that are increasing in monetary investments in children. Consequently, parents invest
part of their earnings in their children to maximize their own utility subject to a budget
constraint. This gives the input e⁄ect. The time e⁄ect could be obtained by adding a
time constraint and time investments to the model.
To begin with we estimate the following logistic regression model for a child i from
family j:
(1) Pr(highij = 1jXij;Xj) = F(￿0 + ￿1Xij + ￿2Xj)Parental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 79
where F(z) =
exp(z)
1+exp(z) is the standard logistic distribution.
Highij is a binary variable that equals one if a child attends or has already ￿nished
high secondary track and zero otherwise. Xij is a vector of characteristics that di⁄er
for di⁄erent children of one family. It contains (i) child characteristics, namely a
child￿ s year of birth (normalized by subtracting 1984, the ￿rst year observed in our
data) and binary indicators of a child￿ s sex, whether a child is the ￿rstborn child
and whether a child is born between January and June47, (ii) total net equivalent
income of the household averaged over the ages 0-3 of the child and (iii) time varying
parent characteristics: separate indicators for whether father and mother were younger
than 22 or older than 36 when the child was born as well as information on mother￿ s
and father￿ s employment or time spent on child care at ages 0-3 of child i.48 Xj is
a vector of characteristics that are shared by di⁄erent siblings of one family j. It
encompasses (i) household characteristics, here whether the household is classi￿ed as
foreign (subsamples B and D in the GSOEP data) and (ii) time invariant characteristics
of parents (father￿ s and mother￿ s total years of education measured as schooling plus
apprenticeship plus university studies) and (iii) a vector of state dummies. ￿0 is a
constant and ￿k;k = 1;2 are vectors of unknown parameters.
The coe¢ cients of interest are those of parental employment or time spent on child
care. Since we control for household income, they measure the time e⁄ect of parents￿
employment on a child￿ s track choice.
To identify the true underlying coe¢ cients we need to address potential endogeneity
problems due to omitted variables. First, since a child￿ s ability is unobserved coe¢ -
cients of explanatory variables that are correlated with ability may be inconsistently
estimated. In particular, this might be the case for the e⁄ect of parental employment if
parents condition their employment on their child￿ s ability (reverse causality). To give
47In Germany, children born between January and June (July and December) usually enter school
in autumn of the year in which they become six (seven) years old. Puhani and Weber (2007) show
that children who enter school at an older age because they are born between July and December
perform better at school and have a higher probability of attending high secondary track.
48Averages over household income and time input information are taken over the years in which
the information is available, i.e. for some observations we just observe information in one or two out
of three years. For both household income and time input variables results are robust if we use only
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an extreme example, parents with disabled children might not work at all. We exclude
children attending Sonderschule, i.e. disabled children or children with very low ability
from our analysis. Apart from these extreme cases, our identi￿cation strategy assumes
that parents do not know their child￿ s ability as long as their child is su¢ ciently young
and, thus, cannot condition their employment decision on their child￿ s ability. The
idea is that information revelation takes time and the amount of feedback increases
only as a child grows.49 To make this argument plausible we exclusively use parents￿
labor market participation when children are aged 0-3. As an additional safeguard, we
include parents￿education as a proxy variable for their child￿ s ability. Here, we exploit
that parents￿education is correlated with their own ability which in turn is partially
inherited by their children.
Second, selection of parents in the labor market is a potential problem. Imagine
that parents with unobserved characteristics uj that are either especially supportive
or detrimental to raising children systematically decide (not) to work. If this were the
case, the coe¢ cients of parents￿employment would not only capture the time e⁄ect
that we would like to measure, but also the e⁄ect of parents￿unobserved characteristics
on the child￿ s educational attainment. To control for all time-invariant unobserved
parent characteristics we estimate a model on sibling di⁄erences (compare Ermisch
and Francesconi, 2002 for a similar application). Identi￿cation rests on the assumption
that parents￿relevant unobserved characteristics summarized in uj (e.g. the quality of
parent-child interactions) do not vary for di⁄erent siblings.
To estimate a model on sibling di⁄erences we drop all observations on children
without siblings from the sample. We sort all children of a family (who are born
between 1984 and 1996 and for whom complete information is available) by age and
build pairs of siblings. A pair consists of two adjacent siblings such that we get n ￿ 1
di⁄erences for n siblings. To be able to interpret our results in terms of probability
of high secondary track attendance we need to estimate a binary model. For this
purpose we construct sorted di⁄erences: ￿rst, we subtract values of all variables that
belong to the older sibling from the values of the corresponding variables of the younger
49Our argument is similar to Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1995) who argue that parents update their
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sibling. This results in a new di⁄erenced dependent variable that takes values -1, 0 or 1.
Second, to be back in a binary framework we multiply all (dependent and explanatory)
di⁄erenced variables of a sibling pair with -1 if the di⁄erenced dependent variable is
originally -1 ("sorting"). Equation (2) illustrates this procedure for the oldest two
siblings of a family in a linear probability model:





1 if (high2j ￿ high1j) 2 f0;1g
￿1 if (high2j ￿ high1j) = ￿1
.
The numbers 1 and 2 index the ￿rst and second born sibling respectively. By
construction, all explanatory variables that have the same value for siblings, i.e. uj and
Xj, are dropped in a sibling di⁄erence estimation. Di⁄erences in parents￿age at birth
are collinear with the di⁄erence in years of birth of two siblings and are also dropped.
While the original constant term ￿0 disappears due to di⁄erencing, we include a new
constant term f ￿0 to account for the e⁄ect of being sorted ￿rst (compare Ermisch and
Francesconi, 2002 and Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998). The new constant term f ￿0 arises
from di⁄erencing a dummy variable that is equal to one if a sibling is sorted ￿rst and
zero otherwise. f ￿0 captures that due to sorting the sibling sorted ￿rst in the di⁄erence
has a higher probability of attending high secondary track. The interpretation of the
sign, but not the level of the coe¢ cients in the di⁄erence model is the same as in
the level model. For example, imagine that we had estimated a signi￿cantly positive
coe¢ cient ￿k for the e⁄ect of the di⁄erence in maternal weekly hours worked in a
linear probability model. Then ￿k would imply that having a mother who works one
hour more when sibling 2 (sorted ￿rst) is small than when sibling 1 is small increases
the probability that sibling 2 attends high secondary track while sibling 1 does not by
￿k ￿100 percentage points. Hence, a positive (negative) sign still stands for a positive
(negative) e⁄ect.
In contrast to Ermisch and Francesconi (2002), we estimate a linear probability
model on the di⁄erences and not a logit (or probit) model. The reason is that with
a logit or probit model the assumption that the error term has a standard logistic or
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model.50 The main disadvantage of a linear probability model is that it may predict
probabilities larger than unity or smaller than zero for extreme values of explanatory
variables. Since we are interested in the average marginal e⁄ects this is not a major
problem. Furthermore, we will check how close the estimates of the average marginal
e⁄ects in a linear probability model are to those obtained in a probit model.
A more commonly used alternative to a sibling di⁄erence model is a household ￿xed
e⁄ect model (conditional logit model). In our application, a conditional logit model
uses only those observations on sibling pairs in which one sibling attends high secondary
track and the other one does not. It estimates coe¢ cients by comparing sibling pairs
in which the older sibling attends high secondary track to sibling pairs in which the
younger sibling attends high secondary track. Thus, identi￿cation of the e⁄ect of
parental employment on children￿ s educational attainment stems from observations in
which both educational outcome and parental employment di⁄er across siblings. In
contrast, our sibling di⁄erence model also uses observations from families in which
all children go to the same secondary track and estimates coe¢ cients by comparing
siblings pairs in which both siblings do or do not attend high secondary track to
sibling pairs in which only one sibling attends high secondary track. Consequently, the
identi￿cation of the e⁄ect of parental employment on children￿ s educational attainment
stems from all observations in which parental employment di⁄ers across siblings. We
prefer estimating a sibling di⁄erence model to estimating a household ￿xed e⁄ect model
because the former uses more observations which allows estimating coe¢ cients more
precisely.
50The variance of the di⁄erence of two random variables is equal to the sum of the two variances
minus the covariance. Thus, the variance of the di⁄erence of two random variables with a standard
logistic (normal) distribution only equals the variance of the standard logistic (normal) distribution if
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Estimation on levels
We will ￿rst present results from a logit estimation (Table 3.3) that does not address
endogeneity problems caused by unobserved parent characteristics. The results are still
a useful benchmark for comparison with other studies that use similar speci￿cations.
Additionally, results provide some information on the coe¢ cients of variables that are
constant for siblings and thus will drop out when estimating a sibling di⁄erence model.
While the coe¢ cient of mother￿ s average hours worked is not signi￿cant, the coef-
￿cient of father￿ s average hours worked is weakly signi￿cant (p=0.080) and positive.
Setting all control variables to their mean the predicted marginal e⁄ect if the father
would work one hour more per week in every year is a 0.5 % increase in the probability
that his child attends high secondary track. Furthermore, male children are predicted
to attend high secondary track less often than female children. Firstborn children are
more likely, children born between January and June are marginally less likely to at-
tend high secondary track. In Puhani and Weber (2007) children who enter school at
an older age because they are born between July and December have a 12 % higher
probability of attending high secondary track. If control variables are set to their
mean, our results predict a 9 % higher probability of attending high secondary track.
Having a father who is at most 21 in the year of birth is predicted to have an adverse
e⁄ect on the child￿ s educational attainment, having a relatively old mother seems to be
supportive. Both coe¢ cients are likely to su⁄er from endogeneity problems and hence
might re￿ ect unobserved parents￿characteristics that are correlated with the included
age intervals. The coe¢ cients of parents￿total years of education are highly signi￿cant
and positive. We use state dummies to control for state speci￿c di⁄erences in shares
of students attending high secondary track.51
51Results reported in Table 3.3 are very robust to using mother￿ s and father￿ s age and age squared
instead of age intervals, including year dummies instead of imposing a linear time trend or to including
dummies for the number of siblings which we do not do because it reduces the number of observations
by about 10 %. Furthermore, using an ordered logit speci￿cation with a dependent variable that takes
the values 1 to 3 for general, intermediate and high secondary track attendance produces estimates
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Table 3.3: Base speci￿cation: logit estimation on levels
binary dependent variable: child attends high secondary track
explanatory variables coe¢ cient p-value
mother￿ s weekly hours worked* 0.000 0.960
father￿ s weekly hours worked* 0.019 0.080
male -0.639 0.008
born before July -0.380 0.095
￿rstborn child 0.635 0.003
year of birth - 1984 -0.006 0.889
age of mother at birth <=21 0.598 0.133
age of mother at birth >36 0.987 0.034
age of father at birth <=21 -3.822 0.000
age of father at birth >36 0.259 0.487
mother￿ s total years of education 0.420 0.000
father￿ s total years of education 0.348 0.000
household income*,** 0.086 0.927
(household income)2 *,** -0.080 0.785





* average at ages 0-3 of child
** total monthly net household equivalent income in 1000 Euros
comment: robust, clustered standard errors that allow observations
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Table 3.4 presents the coe¢ cients of parental time inputs. The upper part uses
hours worked per week averaged over the ages 0-3 of a child as measure of time inputs,
the middle part hours spent on child care on a typical weekday averaged over the ages
0-3 of a child. The lower part presents coe¢ cients of type of employment, e.g. variables
that indicate how many out of a child￿ s ￿rst three years parents did work full-time,
part-time or not at all. The omitted categories are the most common ones: working full
time for fathers and not working at all for mothers. The table contains the coe¢ cients
from three di⁄erent speci￿cations. Speci￿cation A uses observations from families in
which both parents are present (in our data) and information on both parents￿time
inputs, age and education is completely available. As most studies on the relationship
between parental employment and children￿ s educational attainment speci￿cation B
does not include information on father￿ s age, education and time inputs as explanatory
variables. Hence, it additionally includes observations from families with single mothers
and families with present fathers on whom information is incomplete which raises the
number of observations by about 20 %. We add a dummy variable for absent fathers
that turns out not to be signi￿cant. Speci￿cation C adds a dummy variable that
takes a value of one if the father is present and zero otherwise and reports coe¢ cients
of father￿ s age, education and time inputs when age, education and time inputs are
interacted with this dummy. Otherwise explanatory variables in Table 3.4 are the same
as in Table 3.3.
In the eight additional speci￿cations, all coe¢ cients of parental time inputs are
not signi￿cant with one exception: the coe¢ cient of mother￿ s full time employment is
negative and signi￿cant (p=0.022) in speci￿cation B.
3.5.2 Estimation on sibling di⁄erences
The sample
The siblings sample contains data on 550 siblings from 249 families. Table 3.2 com-
pares means in the general and the siblings sample. The siblings sample is largely
representative for the general sample. Di⁄erences in means usually occur only in theParental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 86
Table 3.4: Further speci￿cations: logit estimation on levels
binary dependent variable: child attends high secondary track
coe¢ cients of average weekly hours worked
speci￿cation (A) (B) (C)
mother 0.000 -0.008 0.006
(0.960) (0.327) (0.487)
father 0.019 - 0.012
(0.080) - (0.297)
N 1047 1280 1214
Pseudo R2 0.393 0.305 0.354
coe¢ cients of type of employment in years
speci￿cation (A) (B) (C)
full time mother -0.189 -0.253 -0.198
(0.210) (0.022) (0.158)
part time mother 0.044 -0.044 0.088
(0.795) (0.739) (0.568)
part time father -0.422 - -0.493
(0.530) - (0.407)
non-working father 0.200 - 0.239
(0.352) - (0.276)
N 962 1195 1118
Pseudo R2 0.388 0.335 0.372
coe¢ cients of average hours spent on child care per weekday
speci￿cation (A) (B) (C)
mother 0.050 0.031 0.005
(0.156) (0.300) (0.867)
father -0.110 - -0.096
(0.092) - (0.157)
N 1032 1262 1199
Pseudo R2 0.387 0.302 0.348
comments: robust, clustered standard errors that allow observations
to be correlated within a family; p-values are reported in brackets
(A): uses only observations with complete information on both parents
(B): uses all observations with complete information on mother
(C): estimates coe¢ cients of father￿ s age, education and time inputs
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second position after the decimal point. Of course, the sibling sample contains fewer
￿rstborn children (40 % instead of 48 %). On average, mothers in the siblings sample
work 2.5 hours less per week and spend 0.6 additional hours per day on child care.
Father￿ s employment is very similar in both samples.
Kernel density estimates
To get a ￿rst impression whether di⁄erences in parental employment could be driving
di⁄erences in siblings￿educational attainment we estimate non-parametric Kernel den-
sities. The solid line depicts sibling pairs who either both attend high secondary track
or both do not. The dashed line stands for sibling pairs in which one sibling attends
high secondary track, but the other one does not. Again, the sibling attending high
secondary track is sorted ￿rst in the di⁄erence. Figure 3.1 (Figure 3.2) displays Ker-
nel density estimates of the distributions of di⁄erences in average hours worked by
mothers (fathers) when children were aged 0-3 for these two kinds of sibling pairs. If
having a mother or father with longer working hours would reduce the attendance of
high secondary track we would expect the dashed line to be ￿rst order stochastically
dominated by the solid line.
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Eyeballing suggests that estimated densities are very similar. Non-parametric, two-
sided Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on the original (not the displayed
estimated) distributions con￿rm that distributions do not di⁄er signi￿cantly: for moth-
ers pMW = 0:394 and pKS = 0:824 and for fathers pMW = 0:740 and pKS = 0:404. At
￿rst sight, di⁄erences in parental employment patterns do not seem to be a driving
force behind di⁄erent levels of educational attainments.52
Multivariate analysis
To control for di⁄erences between siblings apart from parental employment we estimate
a linear probability model on sibling di⁄erences to explain di⁄erent educational out-
comes. The estimation requires su¢ cient variation in both dependent and explanatory
variables. In all speci￿cations, we have about 20 % of sibling pairs in which just one
sibling attends high secondary track. Table 3.5 and Figures 3.1-3.4 document substan-
tial variation in mother￿ s and father￿ s average hours worked as well as in time spent
on child care. By construction variation is largest in working hours that are measured
52Appendix 3.7.1 displays estimated Kernel densities for the average time parents spent on child
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per week, followed by hours spent on child care measured at a daily level. Variation is
smallest for type of employment that is measured in years such that di⁄erences can at
most range from -3 to 3. For this reason we will provide estimates on sibling di⁄erences
only for the former two measures of parental time inputs (in contrast to Ermisch and
Francesconi (2002) who use the di⁄erence in type of employment).
For our baseline speci￿cation, Table 3.6 compares the marginal e⁄ects predicted by
an estimation on sibling di⁄erences using the linear probability or the probit model.
The marginal e⁄ects - especially the signi￿cant ones - are very similar. Thus, the usual
drawbacks of estimating a linear probability model are not a major concern in our
application and for the reasons outlined in section 3.4 we prefer the linear probability
model.
Results in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that di⁄erences in father￿ s employment do not
contribute signi￿cantly to explaining di⁄erences in educational attainment. The coe¢ -
cient of di⁄erences in mother￿ s employment is positive and just not signi￿cant (in Table
3.7, p=0.105 in speci￿cation (A) and (C) and p=0.085 in speci￿cation (B)). The pre-
cision of our baseline estimate (speci￿cation (A)) implies that we can statistically rule
out that having a mother who works one hour more per week (when the sibling sorted
￿rst was young than when the second sibling was young) lowers the probability that
the sibling who is sorted ￿rst attends high secondary track (while the second sibling
does not) by more than 0.1 percentage points. Similarly, the alternative speci￿cations
in Table 3.7 show that average time spent on child care does not in￿ uence attendance
of high secondary track signi￿cantly.53 As in the level estimation our sibling di⁄erence
estimates in Table 3.6 predict children who are born between January and June to be
less likely and ￿rstborn children to be more likely to attend high secondary track. The
advantage of ￿rstborn children even increases with each year they are apart from the
second born sibling. In contrast to the level estimation, the sex of a child is no longer
signi￿cant.
The size of coe¢ cients in the level and the di⁄erence estimation is not directly
comparable since they refer to characteristics measured in levels or di⁄erences between
53Results in Table 3.7 are robust to adding a squared term for mother￿ s and father￿ s time inputs.Parental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 90
Table 3.5: Variation in key explanatory variables
di⁄erenced variable mean standard zeros min max N
deviation (%)
mother￿ s hours worked -.822 9.960 57.48 -40 55 301
father￿ s hours worked .106 10.732 17.28 -54 45 301
mother￿ s hours spent on child care .525 3.497 16.61 -10 19 295
father￿ s hours spent on child care -.167 2.008 17.63 -9 10 295
mother￿ s full time employment -.076 .601 86.59 -3 3 276
mother￿ s part time employment .007 .772 70.65 -3 3 276
non-working mother .069 .906 65.22 -3 3 276
father￿ s full time employment .025 .581 87.68 -3 3 276
father￿ s part time employment -.007 .256 97.46 -3 2 276
non-working father -.007 .490 90.58 -3 3 276
Table 3.6: Linear probability and probit model on sibling di⁄erences
dependent variable: sibling di⁄erence in high secondary track attendance
model linear probability probit
di⁄erenced variables coe¢ - p-value 95 % con￿dence marginal p-value
cient interval e⁄ects*
mother￿ s hours worked** 0.005 0.105 [-0.001, 0.012] 0.005 0.073
father￿ s hours worked** 0.004 0.529 [-0.008, 0.015] 0.002 0.589
male 0.009 0.715 [-0.040, 0.058] 0.016 0.488
born before July -0.097 0.032 [-0.185, -0.009] -0.093 0.008
￿rstborn child 0.151 0.003 [0.050, 0.251] 0.089 0.015
year of birth - 1984 -0.042 0.005 [-0.071, -0.012] -0.029 0.030
household income*** 0.019 0.961 [-0.740, 0.777] 0.032 0.928
(household income)2 *** 0.026 0.837 [-0.221, 0.273] 0.003 0.977
constant 0.317 0.000 [0.228, 0.406] -0.063 0.000
N 301 301
R2 0.240 0.251
* all other explanatory variables are evaluated at their mean
** average per week at ages 0-3 of child
*** total monthly net household equivalent income in 1000 Euros, average at ages 0-3 of child
comment: robust, clustered standard errors that allow observations to be correlated within
a familyParental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 91
Table 3.7: Further speci￿cations: linear probability model on sibling di⁄erences
dep. var.: sibling di⁄erence in high secondary track attendance
coe¢ cients of di⁄erence in hours worked, average per week
speci￿cation (A) (B) (C)
mother 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.105) (0.085) (0.105)
father 0.004 - 0.003
(0.529) - (0.582)
N 301 372 345
R2 0.240 0.307 0.321
coe¢ cients of di⁄erence in time spent on child care,
average per weekday
speci￿cation (A) (B) (C)
mother -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.747) (0.688) (0.772)
father -0.016 - -0.012
(0.361) - (0.478)
N 295 361 338
R2 0.239 0.293 0.314
comments: robust, clustered standard errors that allow observations
to be correlated within a family; p-values are reported in brackets
(A): uses only observations with complete information on both parents
(B): uses all observations with complete information on mother
(C): estimates coe¢ cients of father￿ s age, education and time inputs
conditional on father being presentParental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 92
siblings, respectively. Still, the interpretation of coe¢ cients￿signs (i.e. whether we
observe a negative or positive e⁄ect) is comparable. The signi￿cance levels and, thus,
implications from the level and di⁄erence estimation di⁄er markedly. Table 3.2 docu-
ments that di⁄erences are not caused by di⁄erent sample characteristics. This suggests
that controlling for unobserved parent characteristics a⁄ects results and should be-
come the standard in the literature on the e⁄ects of parental employment on children￿ s
educational attainment.
Furthermore, mother￿ s and father￿ s time inputs do not seem to in￿ uence children￿ s
educational outcomes in di⁄erent ways: we can reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients
of mother￿ s and father￿ s employment and time spent on child care di⁄er signi￿cantly
(F-tests for speci￿cations (A) in Table 3.7 yield F=0.09, p=0.763 for hours worked
and F=0.33 and p=0.565 for time spent on child care). Table 3.8, Columns (4) and
(5) in Appendix 3.7.2 display estimates for parents￿joint working hours and joint time
spent on child care. Since the coe¢ cients of joint time inputs are not signi￿cant, they
con￿rm our previous results.
Additionally, we check whether the e⁄ect of parental employment di⁄ers at di⁄erent
ages of the child, in our case at age 1, 2 and 3 (see Appendix 3.7.2, Table 3.9). Some
studies that focus on children￿ s short term outcomes have found that maternal employ-
ment during the ￿rst year of a child is especially detrimental. For example, Ruhm￿ s
(2000) and Waldfogel, Han and Brooks-Gunn￿ s (2002) results imply that maternal em-
ployment during the ￿rst year of a child reduces math, reading and verbal achievement
test scores at the ages 3-8 substantially. Our results on long-term outcomes are not
consistent with this ￿nding. In contrast, the coe¢ cient of maternal working hours dur-
ing the ￿rst year is marginally signi￿cant (p=0.082) and positive. F-tests for equality
of coe¢ cients document that each parent￿ s coe¢ cients do not di⁄er across the ages 0-3
of a child. This justi￿es our approach of averaging time input information over the
￿rst three years.54
54For the three coe¢ cients of mother￿ s (father￿ s) hours worked F=1.02 and p=0.364 (F=0.41 and
p=0.666), for the three coe¢ cients of mother￿ s (father￿ s) time spent on child care F=0.54 and p=0.586
(F=0.06 and p=0.939). Furthermore, in both speci￿cations all six parents￿coe¢ cients do not di⁄er
signi￿cantly (F=0.58 and p=0.713 for hours worked and F=0.42 and p=0.832 for time spent on child
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3.6 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed whether parental employment a⁄ects children￿ s educational
attainment. We have explicitly addressed potential endogeneity problems: to control
for unobserved parent characteristics we have used estimates on sibling di⁄erences. To
avoid inconsistent estimates due to reverse causality we have dropped disabled children
from the analysis, have focused exclusively on parental employment when children are
young (aged 0-3) such that signals about ability are still scarce and have included
parent￿ s education as a proxy variable.
Our measures of parental time inputs exclusively capture quantity, not quality -
though quality is controlled for in the sibling di⁄erence estimates to the extent quality
of parent-child interactions does not di⁄er for di⁄erent siblings. Due to lack of data, we
have not controlled for non-parental time and good inputs and have ignored potentially
important di⁄erences between di⁄erent kinds of non-parental child care (such as atten-
dance of Kindergarten, child care by relatives or nannies). These are important issues
left for future research. Still, it is often argued that parental employment patterns per
se shape a child￿ s environment and outcomes. This is what we have tested for.
In sum, our results do not support worries that parental employment is detrimental
for children￿ s educational attainment. The core of our analysis are the estimates on
sibling di⁄erences that use average weekly working hours when the child is aged 0-3
to measure parental time inputs: given their precision, we can statistically rule out
that having a mother who works one hour more per week lowers the probability of
high secondary track attendance by more than 0.1 percentage points, an economically
negligible number. Actually, all coe¢ cients of maternal employment are positive but
not signi￿cant at conventional signi￿cance levels (though at an 9 to 11 % level). The
corresponding coe¢ cients of paternal employment and estimates using parental time
spent on child care instead of working hours are not signi￿cant. Taken together, our
results imply that it is not parental employment or quantity of parent-child interactions
that are decisive for children￿ s educational attainments, but, for example, birth order
within a family, age relative to classmates or parental characteristics.Parental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 94
With respect to the current debate about the expansion of day care facilities in
Germany our results do clearly not support worries that a more comprehensive child
care infrastructure will hurt children￿ s future prospects by raising maternal employ-
ment. Of course, our estimates are based on data from the past. To some extent,
the current reforms will lead to changes in the institutional environment and perhaps
also society￿ s attitudes towards working mothers that may a⁄ect the interplay between
parental employment and child outcomes.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Kernel density estimates for time spent on child care
Figure 3.3 (Figure 3.4) displays Kernel density estimates of the distributions of dif-
ferences in average hours spent on child care by mothers (fathers). The dashed line
depicts sibling pairs in which one sibling attends high secondary track and the other
one does not. The solid line marks siblings who either both attend high secondary
track or both do not.
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Non-parametric, two-sided Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on the
original distributions con￿rm that distributions do not di⁄er signi￿cantly for fathers,
pMW = 0:953 and pKS = 0:884. In contrast, distributions of mother￿ s time spent on
child care di⁄er marginally: pMW = 0:076 and pKS = 0:099. Regression results in
Table 3.7 show that di⁄erences in the time that mothers spent on child care cannot
explain di⁄erent educational attainment of siblings when other explanatory variables
are controlled for.Parental employment and children￿ s educational attainment 96
3.7.2 Robustness checks
Table 3.8: Robustness checks I
dependent variable: sibling di⁄erence in high secondary track attendance
speci￿cation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
sample general West Germ. general general general
dependent variable latest obs. latest obs. at age 14 latest obs. latest obs.
di⁄erenced variables
mother￿ s weekly hours 0.005 0.006 0.004 - -
worked* (0.105) (0.113) (0.268) - -
father￿ s weekly hours 0.004 0.004 0.001 - -
worked* (0.529) (0.629) (0.892) - -
parents￿joint weekly - - - 0.004 -
hours worked* - - - (0.180) -
parents￿joint hours - - - - -0.007
spent on child care* - - - - (0.353)
male 0.009 0.006 -0.012 0.009 0.011
(0.715) (0.884) (0.780) (0.732) (0.683)
born before July -0.097 -0.112 -0.127 -0.094 -0.085
(0.032) (0.033) (0.029) (0.024) (0.027)
￿rstborn child 0.151 0.151 0.165 0.148 0.168
(0.003) (0.057) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
year of birth -0.042 -0.043 -0.042 -0.043 -0.040
(0.005) (0.016) (0.096) (0.001) (0.003)
household income** 0.019 0.074 0.379 0.030 0.174
(0.961) (0.867) (0.585) (0.935) (0.715)
(household income)2 ** 0.026 0.006 -0.070 0.023 -0.022
(0.837) (0.986) (0.748) (0.849) (0.883)
constant 0.317 0.330 0.374 0.317 0.327
(0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 301 213 163 301 295
R2 0.240 0.251 0.220 0.234 0.236
* average at ages 0-3 of child
** total monthly net equivalent income in 1000 Euros, average at ages 0-3 of child
comments: robust, clustered standard errors that allow observations to be correlated within
a family; p-values are reported in bracketsBibliography 97
Table 3.9: Robustness checks II
dependent variable: sibling di⁄erence in high secondary track attendance
key explanatory variables di⁄erence in weekly di⁄erence in daily hours
hours worked spent on child care
di⁄erenced variables
mother￿ s time input at age 1 0.004 -0.001
(0.082) (0.860)
mother￿ s time input at age 2 0.000 0.007
(0.970) (0.270)
mother￿ s time input at age 3 0.000 -0.005
(0.867) (0.515)
father￿ s time input at age 1 0.001 -0.002
(0.754) (0.891)
father￿ s time input at age 2 0.003 -0.001
(0.236) (0.903)




born before July -0.053 0.015
(0.184) (0.741)
￿rstborn child 0.164 0.150
(0.010) (0.018)
year of birth -0.061 -0.058
(0.000) (0.000)
household income* 0.530 -0.147
(0.234) (0.807)






* total monthly net equivalent income in 1000 Euros, average at ages 0-3 of child
comments: robust, clustered standard errors that allow observations to be correlated
within a family; p-values are reported in bracketsBibliography
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